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ABSTRACT
ARINC Research Corporation conducted a three-month assessment of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Flight Assurance
Review Program to develop minimum standard guidelines for flight assurance
reviews. We evaluated more than 70 documents from eight NASA centers and
NASA Headquarters to determine current design review practices and
procedures. On the basis of that analysis, we identified six reviews as
being the recommended minimum. We analyzed and synthesized the practices
and procedures used at the different centers to incorporate the most
effective ones into the minimum standard review guidelines. We defined
guidelines in terms of procedures, personnel and responsibilities, review
items/data checklist, and feedback and closeout.
This report presents the results of our assessment. It identifies
and describes the six reviews recommended and presents the minimum
standard guidelines developed for flight assurance reviews. It also
presents observations and conclusions for further improving the NASA
review and quality assurance process.
SUMMARY
Under Contract NASW-3787, ARINC Research Corporation conducted an
assessment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Flight Assurance Review Program to develop minimum standard guidelines for
flight assurance reviews. We Identified six reviews as being the
recommended minimum, and analyzed and synthesized the practices and
procedures used at the different NASA centers to be incorporated into the
review guidelines.
To conduct the assessment, we performed four tasks:
- Task 1 - Collect and Analyze Data from Centers
- Task 2 - Develop a Matrix of Flight Review and Certification
Practices
- Task 3 - Select the Best Practices
- Task 4 - Develop Guidelines for NASA-Wide Practices
During our assessment, we identified the following six reviews as
being the recommended minimum for the Flight Assurance Review Program:
- Preliminary Requirements Review
- Preliminary Design Review
- Critical Design Review
- Preshipment Review
- Design Certification Review
- Flight Readiness Review
We defined the minimum standard guidelines for the NASA Flight
Assurance Review Program in terms of the following items:
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Procedures
The method of convening the Review Board or Team, the selection of
the Board or Team members, and a general description of the activities of
the Board or Team.
Personnel and Responsibilities
Because titles vary from center to center, personnel are described in
terms of management level and technical competence rather than by title.
Responsibilities of persons and groups of persons (such as Review Board or
Team members) are related to the Review Board or Team component (i.e.,
cognizant manager, chairman, etc.).
Review Items/Data Checklist
A compilation of matters to be considered by the Review Board or Team
for each of the six reviews.
Feedback and Closeout
A process that begins with the identification of a problem or concern
and continues through the disposition of all action items, in keeping with
the basic objective of providing assurance to NASA management that the
requirements of a program or project are satisfied.
The minimum standard review guidelines were developed from a
synthesis of the practices and procedures of the NASA centers so that they
can be applied to as many projects and programs as possible. Three of the
preceding items (procedures, personnel and responsibilities, and feedback
and closeout) are common to all Review Board or Team reviews; the review
item data checklist is unique to each of the six reviews.
As a result of our assessment, ARINC Research made the following
observations:
- The NASA centers conduct many different reviews to ensure the
quality and safety of end items.
- The practices and procedures used in conducting reviews follow
similar patterns.
- The terminology used varies somewhat from center to center.
- The detailed documented descriptions of review practices and
procedures vary greatly from center to center. Personnel must
rely on referenced documents to provide the detail lacking in some
of the documents supplied for this study.
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- Documents from individual centers do not always clearly describe
an in-depth review process; it was often necessary to refer to a
number of documents to obtain confidence that the review process
has the necessary depth and includes all of the necessary elements.
- Few of the documents supplied indicate an in-depth feedback and
closeout process.
- Some of the documents do not describe procedures of the Review
Board or Team or a review item/data checklist.
- There was little documentation supplied describing the decision
process for determining payload classifications (A, B, C, or D),
or for determining the differences in the reviews for each
classified payload.
- Most reviews are conducted by the persons directly associated with
the end item under review.
- The Review Board chairman is generally directly associated with
the program or project under review.
- The review descriptions do not indicate how upper-level Review
Boards or management are advised of action-item closeouts, leading
to the assumption that a closeout stops at the level at which it
was approved.
- The review descriptions do not indicate a process for moving open
action items to a higher-level review.
- The review practices and procedures of the Department of Defense
(DoD) and the Federal Aviation Administration.(FAA) do not offer
significant areas of improvement to NASA.
On the basis of these observations, we reached the following
conclusions:
- A standard format for review practices and procedures, including
standard terminology, should be used by all centers.
- A procedure should be devised and implemented for advising a
central office at Headguarters of improvements to the standard
review practices and procedures so that all centers can be kept
fully informed.
- Minimum standard review guidelines promulgated by a central office
at Headguarters should be structured in a manner that allows each
center flexibility in interpreting the standards to meet diverse
mission requirements.
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- A procedure should be devised and implemented for advising a
central office at Headquarters of changed review practices and
procedures to meet specific mission requirements.
- The chairman of the Review Board or Team should be selected first
for management ability and second for technical competence; the
chairman should not be directly associated with the program or
project under review.
- The number of persons on the Review Board or Team (including the
chairman) should be an odd number, and should be the minimum
number necessary to satisfy technical requirements of the program
or project under review. The majority of the members should be
persons not directly associated with the program or project under
review.
- Members of Review Board or Team should be selected for their
technical competence and ability to communicate effectively.
- An approval process should be developed for all changes made under
the standard flight-critical change program. Approval by a
minimum of two persons should be required for changes of the
lowest classification, and approval of a formal review board
should be required for changes of the highest level of criticality.
- Each review should begin with a summary of action items from the
previous review together with a short statement of the current
disposition of each action item.
- A specific standard procedure should be developed to evaluate the
qualification of components, subassemblies, or assemblies on the
basis of previous applications or similarity to another component,
subassembly, or assembly.
- The history of similar systems, components, subassemblies, or
assemblies should be reviewed at the PDR or CDR so as to identify
areas of needed concentrated analysis or review to take advantage
of data regarding previous failures or problem areas.
- When a design change is approved, it may be necessary to review
all subsequent changes related to the approved change or made to
accommodate the approved change.
- One-person reviews or change approval should be avoided.
- Standard procedures and methods should be developed for reviewing
and certifying software. The procedures should include criteria
for identifying the requirements for recertification of software
based on either hardware or software changes.
- The minimum standard review guidelines presented in this report
should be considered for implementation as a NASA management
instruction.
- The minimum standard review guidelines presented in this report
should be used as working papers to solicit comments from all
centers before the guidelines are officially published. A number
of iterations may be necessary to consolidate and coordinate
comments from the centers into the final document.
- An independent third party review may be required for Class A
payloads if the Review Board guidelines do not provide the
required freedom of action which should be expected when the
chairman and over half of the Review Board are not associated with
the project under review.
ARINC Research Corporation recommends that the conclusions detailed
above be considered in the implementation of the minimum standard
guidelines for the NASA Flight Assurance Program.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
One of the functions of the Office of the Chief Engineer of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is to provide
integrated technical and management focus on policies throughout NASA
concerning design certification reviews of all NASA programs. To fulfill
this function, the Office began to collect information from the individual
NASA centers describing the design review processes used. A preliminary
analysis of the collected information showed that each center has
established its own practices and procedures for design reviews.
Different reviews are conducted at different centers and, where there are
similar reviews at two or more centers, different implementation practices
are used. Because of these differences, it was determined that a more
detailed study of the information supplied was required. ARINC Research
Corporation was contracted to conduct an assessment of the practices and
procedures used at the different centers, select the most effective ones,
synthesize them into a set of standard review processes, and develop
recommended guidelines for their implementation.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of the effort was to develop guidelines for
minimum standard review procedures applicable across all NASA activities.
The primary objective was to be obtained through completion of two interim
objectives:
- Evaluate the existing critical flight program review practices and
procedures followed by the various NASA centers.
- Select the most effective practices and procedures used in each
step of the review process.
1.3 DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
The Statement of Work set forth four tasks for the study. They are
described in the following subsections.
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1.3.1 Task 1 - Collect and Analyze Data from Centers
The Office of the Chief Engineer supplied documents from the various
NASA centers showing current review procedures. The objective of Task 1
was to analyze the procedures to determine practices followed, data used
in each review, feedback processes, and the nature of the action item
review process.
Each review process was to be charted to compare the various steps
and decision paths followed at each center, and the charts were to be
reviewed with the cognizant NASA technical monitor. In addition, a
glossary of terms used by the different centers was to be compiled to
provide a basis for establishing common definitions for the practices to
be followed.
1.3.2 Task 2 - Develop a Matrix of Plight Review and Certification
Practices
The information from Task 1 was to be used to develop matrices for
the various center reviews showing all of the steps followed, including
personnel Involved; review items/data and analysis required; referenced
NASA standards, instructions, bulletins, or other documents; and any
decisions made and possible outcomes. Upon completion of Task 2, a letter
report was to be prepared documenting the current practices.
1.3.3 Task 3 - Select the Best Practices
Following development of the matrices, the most effective practices
were to be reviewed with NASA and selected in three steps, as follows:
- Define the steps in the review and design certification process to
be recommended.
- Review the matrices to select the best practices applicable.
- Develop a new matrix for the standard process.
1.3.4 Task 4 - Develop Guidelines for NASA-Wide Practices
The results of Task 3 were to be expanded into practices applicable
throughout NASA for conducting flight assurance reviews. The expanded
review practices were then to be documented as minimum standard review
guidelines, defined in terms of:
- Procedures
- Personnel and responsibilities
- Review items/data checklist
- Feedback and closeout
In addition, any requirements for new instructions, directives, or
quality assurance guidelines were to be identified.
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1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Chapter Two of this report presents the study approach, describing
the analysis of the current review practices and procedures and the
process by which the minimum standard review guidelines were developed.
Chapter Three presents the minimum standard guidelines for flight
assurance reviews. Chapter Four presents the observations and conclusions
resulting from this study. Appendix A is a glossary of terms; Appendix B
lists the documents reviewed; Appendix C lists other documents referenced
by the documents reviewed; Appendix D presents descriptions of current
review practices; and Appendix E presents a discussion of the applica-
bility of the minimum standard guidelines to payload classifications A, B,
C, and D.
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CHAPTER TWO
ASSESSMENT APPROACH
2.L INTRODUCTION
Foe our review of current review practices and procedures, the NASA
Office of the Chief Engineer supplied more than 70 documents from eight
centers and NASA Headquarters. A list of those documents is presented as
Appendix B to this report. In general, all the centers described similar
reviews such as the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and the Critical
Design Review (CDR), but the detailed descriptions of the practices and
procedures varied greatly from center to center. The differences are
probably not as great as they appear, however, because many of the
documents reference other documents (not supplied) that may include
additional procedural details. The documents reviewed provided us with
sufficient data to develop guidelines for agency-wide reviews.
2.2 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
We analyzed the supplied documents in four steps.
We first read each document and developed an annotated flow chart for
each review described. Figure 2-1 is a sample flow chart. We also
prepared a list of terms (Appendix A) and a list of other documents
referenced in the documents under study (Appendix C).
The second step was the development of a matrix that showed, for each
described review, procedures, personnel and responsibilities, review
items/data checklist, and feedback and closeout. Figure 2-2 is a sample
matrix. Each matrix was headed by the title and purpose of the review,
and keyed to the applicable NASA center and document. The appropriate
sections from the document under study were copied and pasted in the
indicated matrix column (see Appendix D).
In the third step, we identified six reviews as being the recommended
minimum for the flight assurance review program:
- Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR)
- Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
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- Critical Design Review (CDR)
- Preshipment Review (PSR)
- Design Certification Review (OCR)
- Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
We prepared a consolidated matrix for each of these reviews from the
matrices developed in Step 2. Figure 2-3 illustrates the matrix form. In
addition to reviewing the NASA documents, we also analyzed both Department
of Defense (DoD) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) design review
documents and interviewed persons familiar with the DoD and FAA review
procedures to determine if any practices and procedures were applicable to
NASA.
Finally, we analyzed the six consolidated matrices and the prepared
flow charts to establish the following:
- Purpose of each of the six reviews
- Procedures to be followed in setting up or convening the Review
Board or Team
- The personnel involved and their responsibilities in the review
process
- A comprehensive review items/data checklist for each of the six
reviews
- A feedback and closeout process common to all reviews
Our original purpose had been to select the best review practices and
procedures from among those described. In our analysis, we found that
this was not evident. Practices and procedures of the various centers
were similar, however, and some were described in more detail than others
which resulted in the assembly of composite practices and procedures which
appeared to be most effective in terras of NASA-wide guidelines.
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MINIMUM STANDARD GUIDELINES
To develop the minimum standard guidelines for the six reviews, we
studied the six consolidated matrices -- one for each type of review. The
guidelines for each type of review were also related to the standard
payload classifications. (Payload classifications are described in
Section 3.5.)
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The procedures for convening a Review Board or Team were defined as
being common to all reviews. Personnel and responsibilities of the Review
Board or Team were also considered to be common to all reviews. A third
area of commonality was the feedback and closeout process, the main
purpose of which is to inform all personnel of the disposition of all
action items established during the review process.
The review items/data checklist was determined to be unique to each
type of review. The checklists were compiled from the various lists of
items and data to be reviewed as described in the documents supplied.
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CHAPTER THREE
MINIMUM STANDARD GUIDELINES FOR THE
NASA FLIGHT ASSURANCE REVIEW PROGRAM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Our analysis of documents from various NASA centers indicated that a
number of similar reviews ace conducted throughout the agency. Although
the processes and terminology used vary from center to center and. in some
cases, within the same center, reviews with similar titles are conducted
in somewhat similar fashion. We found this similarity to be sufficient
for the development of agency-wide review guidelines.
The minimum standard review guidelines described in this chapter are
intended to serve as an aid in establishing an agency-wide Flight
Assurance Review Program. The basic objective of the program is to
provide assurance to management that a design satisfies the specified
requirements for operations, hardware and software end items, and systems
for all mission stages, from original definition through successful flight.
The Flight Assurance Review Program consists of a series of design
reviews, during which applicable technically competent persons convene to
determine whether an end item meets specified requirements. The
objectives of the review program include the following:
- To evaluate whether a design meets the specified end item
requi cements.
- To evaluate whether a design meets the specified requirements of
an assembly of end items and of a total system end item.
- To identify problems and devise solutions to problems identified
for all mission stages, from original definition through flight,
including the areas of design, production, assembly, tests, and
operations.
- To evaluate the effects that proposed design and configuration
changes have on performance.
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- To evaluate the designed operational capabilities of an end item
in teems of state-of-the-act technology.
- To determine whether specifications satisfy mission requirements.
- To determine whether the design of an end item is optimized within
its specified functional requirements.
- To determine the effect that a change in end item design has on
the baseline configuration.
The design reviews are conducted by Review Board or Teams. Section
3.2 describes the levels of Review Boards.
3.2 LEVELS OF REVIEW BOARDS
The Review Board can operate on any of several levels, depending on
the complexity, criticality, and visibility of the program, project,
system, or task under review. The Level I review, the highest level of
review, is conducted by an associate administrator at NASA Headquarters as
a total system review; the Level II review is conducted at the cognizant
center management level as a program review; the Level III review is
conducted as the project management level as a project review; and Level
IV review is conducted at the task management level as an operations,
hardware, or software end item review.
3.3 MINIMUM STANDARD REVIEW GUIDELINES
In determining the minimum standard guidelines for the Flight
Assurance Review Program, we defined each review in terms of procedures,
personnel and responsibilities, review items/data checklist, and feedback
and closeout. All of these areas except review items/data checklist are
generic to each of the six reviews identified; the review items/data
checklist is unique to each review. The four areas are addressed in the
following subsections. Guidelines for procedures, personnel and
responsibilities, and feedback and closeout are presented in Sections
3.3.1 through 3.3.3, respectively. Section 3.3.4 briefly describes the
six reviews and presents the review items/data checklist guidelines for
each.
3.3.1 Procedures
Procedures include the method of convening the Review Board, the
selection of Board members, and a general description of the activities of
the Review Board.
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3.3.1.1 Convening of Review Board
Figure 3-1 illustrates the organization of the Review Board. A
Review Board should be convened by the convening authority which is the
in-line management at least one level above the program or project under
review. The responsibilities of the convening authority should include
the following:
- Prepare and issue a Review Board charter identifying the purpose,
scope, objectives, and authority of the Review Board.
- Identify the specific functions of the Review Board.
- With the assistance of the cognizant manager, select a Review
Board chairman.
- Review agenda and schedule.
- Review Board conclusions and recommendations.
- Approve or reject Board conclusions and recommendations.
The convening authority should be assisted by the cognizant manager
of the program, project, system, or task under review. The cognizant
manager should assist the convening authority and support the Review Board
as follows:
- With the concurrence of the convening authority, recommend the
Review Board chairman.
- With the assistance and concurrence of the Review Board chairman,
recommend the Review Board members.
- Assist the Review Board chairman in the development of the review
agenda in accordance with the charter.
- Ensure that the review item/data package adequately supports the
Review Board charter.
- Prepare a description of how action item disposition will be
handled for the convening authority.
- Monitor the status of action items and report closeouts to the
convening authority.
- Approve and impose the generated action items.
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3.3.1.2 Membership of Review Board
The Review Board chairman selected must have the technical competence
to understand the general technical aspects of the program, project,
system, or task under review. Most important, he or she should have the
ability to maintain a favorable review climate by fostering free
discussion. It is preferable that the chairman not be directly associated
with the program, project, system or task under review in order to
eliminate any tendency toward bias.
Board members should be selected on the basis of their individual
technical capabilities regarding the review subject(s), so that the
collective capabilities and disciplines will satisfy the review
objectives. Preferably, the members should have broad experience in
different projects. In the event that a permanent Review Board is
established to function over an extended period, additional "standby"
members should be selected for their recognized capabilities in the
required specialities and should be rotated as appropriate.
The number of Review Board members should not exceed the minimum
necessary to encompass all the required disciplines under review. The
majority of the Review Board, including the chairman, should be members
who are not directly associated with the program, project, system, or task
under review.
The Review Board often will be supported by teams and subteams
directly involved in the review subject(s). In some cases the Review
Board will require the support of a specialist team, which may be
assembled from the NASA center, from other centers, or from outside NASA.
Often it may be most effective if the specialist team is composed mainly
of individuals who have the necessary technical knowledge but are not
directly associated with the program, project, system, or task under
review.
3.3.1.3 Activities of Review Board
As previously stated, the purpose of the Review Board is to approve
an end item and to provide to NASA management and contractors assurance
that the most satisfactory design has been selected, that an end item has
been produced to meet the specified requirements, or that an end item is
ready for flight. The Review Board is convened for a single purpose or
for multiple purposes, as required by its charter. Input to and output
from the Review Board consists of a systemized and disciplined set of
documents as well as oral presentations describing concerns, problems,
requests for actions, and the disposition of action items.
3-5
Input to the Review Board may include a few requests for action,
review items, or concerns, or it may constitute a large number of items.
The initial input document should be a single-page form describing each
request for action, review item, or concern with supporting
documentation. The document should be delivered as a review package to
the Board, the convening authority, and the cognizant manager in advance
of the scheduled meeting. All personnel should review the review package
before the meeting.
Action items constitute a significant output of the Review Board.
Action items are documented on a standardized form and assigned, with the
assistance of the cognizant manager, to an assignee for action. The
assignee may accept or reject the action item, but in either case the
standardized form must be completed and returned to the Review Board with
supporting documentation and data as required.
The deliberations of the Review Board should be conducted in an open
forum during which all considerations (approval or rejection) of request
for action or review items and concerns are voiced and recorded. The
audience should be free to comment. The conclusions of the Review Board,
whether arrived at unanimously or by consensus, should be documented,
together with the Board minutes and any dissenting opinion, for the record
and for distribution to the convening authority, cognizant manager, and
Board.
3.3.2 Personnel and Responsibilities
Inasmuch as the members of the Review Board are selected on the basis
of their collective capabilities and disciplines, the persons assigned
need not be the leading authorities in their respective specialities.
However, it is important that the collective technical competency of the
Review Board be comparable to that which produced the design under
review. It is also important that the Board include the participation of
as many individuals as possible that are not directly associated with the
program or project under review. Further, the Board must be able to
effectively communicate its deliberations. Therefore, the Review Board
must include the proper mix of personnel with the technical skills and
communications capability to effectively document the results of the
review.
In addition to being responsible for directing program or project
management's attention to design deficiencies, the Review Board must
ensure that a favorable climate exists, including adequate time for
preparation, and that the review procedures provide for free discussion.
The Review Board must not establish a climate that would tend to penalize
a person presenting "bad news."
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The specific responsibilities of each component of the Review Board
are as follows:
- Convening Authority
— Confirm the classification of the payload end item.
— With the assistance of the cognizant manager, select the
review board chairman.
— Issue the charter describing the purpose, scope, and authority
of the review.
— Report the findings of the Board to the next-level review as
appropriate, including a summary of action item dispositions.
— Approve the cognizant manager's response to the Review Board
report.
— Transmit the summary of action item dispositions and open
action item documentation and data to the next-level review.
- Cognizant Manager
— Recommend candidates for Review Board chairman to the
convening authority.
— With the assistance of the chairman select the Review Board
members.
— Contribute to the development of the Review Board charter.
— Ensure that the review package is adequate and distributed on
schedule.
— Support the Review Board chairman in developing the review
agenda.
— Recommend to the convening authority disposition of the
findings and recommendations of the Board.
— Approve and assign the action items that are generated.
— Prepare for the convening authority's approval the written
response to the Board's report, including how action items
will be handled.
— Monitor the status of action items and report the closeout of
action items to the convening authority.
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- Review Board Chairman
-- With the assistance of the cognizant manager, establish a
Review Board agenda to meet the charter requirements,
including all information relevant to the charter.
— Assist the cognizant manager in the selection of the Review
Board members.
— Specify the date and location of review meetings.
— Appoint a secretary.
— Chair the review and keep the discussion open, on the subject,
and on schedule.
— Convene the Review Board as required to deliberate, and to
arrive at findings and recommendations.
— Develop, where necessary, a consensus of findings of the
Board, including an assessment of the risk associated with
problem areas; develop recommendations for action.
— Ensure that a written report of findings, including
recommendations for actions, is submitted on a timely basis to
the convening authority, with a copy to the cognizant manager.
— Approve action item closeout before distribution to Board
members.
- Review Board Members
— Become familiar with the documentation and presentation
material and with the objectives and criteria for assessment
and evaluation before the review.
— Participate in all scheduled meetings and contribute to the
fulfillment of the objectives of the Review Board.
— Assist in developing a disposition for the material reviewed,
make recommendations for action, and contribute to the Review
Board report.
- Review Board Secretary
— Record comments of the Board members.
— Assist the chairman in preparing the Board report.
— Maintain a file of all Board actions, including closeout
memoranda.
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- Review Board Secretary (continued)
— Forward action items to Action Item Control and assignee(s).
— Provide signature approval of the Board report and prepare any
minority report.
- Presenters to the Review Board
— Assemble the data package for the review, including
appropriate documents, and provide handouts of the oral
presentation material and supplementary data as required.
— Hake the oral presentation and respond to questions.
— Assist the cognizant manager in defining action items.
— Follow up on and respond in writing to action items assigned.
Action Item Control may be an assigned individual, a group of
Individuals, or a permanent organization, depending on the complexity of
the program, project, system, or task under review. The responsibilities
of Action Item Control are as follows:
- Assign and maintain action item control numbers for each action
item.
- Maintain the action item and disposition file.
- Distribute numbered action items to related action assignees.
- Prepare an action item summary report showing action item number,
action item description, disposition, and closeout (or open), and
distribute it to the convening authority, cognizant manager,
Review Board members, and action assignee before the next Review
Board meeting.
3.3.3 Feedback and Closeout
The major purpose of the feedback and closeout process is to ensure
that the convening authority, cognizant manager, Review Board chairman,
and members are kept fully apprised of the status of all closed and open
action item reports (also called Review Item Disposition or RID reports).
Figure 3-2 illustrates the feedback and closeout process.
The convening authority convenes the Review Board on the basis of
action item requests, problems, and concerns brought to his or her
attention. In continuing the Review Board, the convening authority
approves or rejects Review Board actions and approves/certifies Review
Board reports to the next-level review. The Cognizant Manager is kept
fully apprised of all activities of the convening authority and Review
Board and supports both as required. The cognizant manager may return a
rejected request for action, problem, concern, open or closed action item
to the convening authority or the Review Board for review.
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Figure 3-2. FEEDBACK AND CLOSEOUT FLOW CHART
3-10
The Review Board chairman, by direction to the secretary, documents
all Board actions and sends copies to all members, the convening
authority, and the cognizant manager. The action item (RID) output of the
Review Board is sent to Action Item Control and is assigned to the
appropriate team or subteam for action with the concurrence of appropriate
management. The assignee(s) within the team or subteam document the
actions taken and inform Action Item Control and assignee management, who
in turn issue open and closed RID reports, with supporting documentation,
to the Review Board. This process continues in a loop until all RIDs are
closed, or until the convening authority determines that remaining open
items must be elevated to another convening authority for a higher-level
Review Board.
The feedback and closeout process is a fundamental audit trail of
action item requests, problems, concerns, and potential problem areas.
Each center should develop specific procedures and implementation
directives that clearly define the handling and disposition of open and
closed RIDs to ensure that the action items are treated properly and that
mechanisms are established to ensure sufficient visibility of the results
of the disposition of the items.
3.4 FLIGHT ASSURANCE REVIEWS AND REVIEW ITEMS/DATA CHECKLISTS
The review items/data checklist consists of matters to be considered
by Review Board for each review. As explained previously, the checklists
are unique to each of the six reviews identified. The following
subsections present a brief description of the reviews, together with the
review items/data checklist for each. Individual reviews may be modified
by charter to meet the requirements of the program, project, system, or
task under review.
3.4.1 Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR)
The purpose of the PRR is to establish the requirements of and the
conceptual approaches to meeting the requirements of the program, project,
system, or task. The PRR lays the groundwork for ensuing reviews and
establishes the following:
- Confirmation of the payload classification as A, B, C, or D (see
Section 3.5)
- Verification of the configuration concepts and requirements
- Verification of the mission objectives
- Qualification of the conceptualized approach
- Approval of the requirements baseline for program or project
- Confirmation that the functional requirements for the system and
subsystem are responsive to the end-item objectives and constraints
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PRR purposes (continued)
- End item suitability o£ the selected configuration by reference to
preliminary drawings and study reports
- Expected suitability of the end item baseline configuration to
meet the required schedule
- Feasibility and development tests required to select and
substantiate design approaches
The PRR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Statement of mission objectives
- Analyses of mission requirements
- Preliminary preferred requirements
- Functional analyses
- Preliminary interface requirements
- Support agreements
- Preliminary reliability and quality assurance requirements
- Scientific requirements
- Concept drawings and sketches
- Block and logic diagrams
- Costs and schedules
- Design-concept documentation
- General test requirements
- Preliminary study reports
- Heritage analyses
3.4.2 Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
The purpose of the PDR is to establish the design and ensure that it
meets the program, project, system, or task end item baseline
requirements. The PDR process includes approval of the basic design
approach, confirmation of the design requirements, and evaluation of the
progress and technical adequacy of the design approach. Further, it
determines whether the selected design approach is compatible with the end
item.
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The PDR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Status of PRR action items
- Final functional cequicements
- Analyses for compliance with functional requirements and
specifications
- Analyses of suitability of inherited designs and hardware
- Environmental design requirements
- Interface design requirements
- Design parameters, restraints, and constraints
- Block diagrams
- Single-point failures analyses
- List of preliminary parts, materials, and processes
- Plan and schedule for hardware and software development (including
verification tests on analyses to be performed)
- Software standards to be applied
- Experiment performance analysis
- Preliminary data management flow and reduction plans
- Plans for safety, reliability, and quality assurance compliance
- Plans for spares provisioning
- Requirements and plans for support equipment
- Plans for preliminary operations
- Schedules and status of the project, including cost and technical
developments
- Design optimization analyses
- Plans and controls documentation
- Design traceability
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3.4.3 Critical Design Review (CDR)
The purpose of the CDR is to verify, when the design of an end item
is essentially complete, the suitability of the design in meeting the
specified requirements, and to determine whether the end item is ready for
manufacture.
The CDR determines whether the designed end item is compatible with
the specified requirements, and verifies that the design conforms to the
requirements established at the PDR and updated to the time of the CDR.
During the CDR, the integrity of the design is verified through review of
analytical and test data and the system capability is established through
reference to all system engineering documentation. The CDR approves or
rejects all released drawings or drawings ready for release.
As a result of the CDR, the design baseline is established, end item
specifications are updated, and specific end item designs are accepted for
release for fabrication.
The CDR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Status of PDR action items
- Assessment of hardware and software inheritance
- Test and performance specifications
- Prototype test results
- Design mechanization and analysis
- Design trade-offs and alternatives considered
- Detailed interfaces and cable configurations
- Detailed analysis of failure modes
- Analyses of safety and human factors
- Maintainability, repairability, operability, and reliability
considerations
- Schedule and resource plans
- Man-machine interfaces
- Training plans
- Conformance of the design to the functional requirements
- Differences between the system and subsystem performances in
relation to the performances estimated at the Preliminary Design
Review
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CDR review items/data checklist (continued)
- Detailed design parameters, restraints, and constraints
- Interface details and agreements
- Weight and power
- Detailed circuit drawings
- Electronic parts classification
- Screening specifications
- List of nonelectronic pacts, materials, and processing
- List of purchased devices
- Materials and processing specifications
- Identification and traceability of materials and specifications
- Electronic and mechanical parts stress analysis results
- Worst-case analysis of end-item failure
- Conformance to environmental design requirements
- Details of design, construction, and electronics packaging
- Quality assurance plans and procedures
- Manufacturing plans
- Configuration control plans (hardware and software)
- Documentation status
- Flow plan and schedule status (hardware and software)
- Problem/failure reporting system
- Failure modes and effects analysis
- Preliminary test plans
- Developmental and detailed test results
- Qualification and acceptance test plans
- Calibration plan
- Data management plan
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CDR review items/data checklist (continued)
- Formal and informal report plans
- Final design verification plans
- Constraints and precautions for initial user handling or operation
- Spares provisioning
- Requirements for support equipment
- Flight operations approach
- Schedule and cost status
- Risk assessment
3.4.4 Preshipment Review (PSR)
The purpose of the PSR is to verify that testing is complete with no
unresolved problems, to evaluate the readiness of the end item for
delivery, and to verify the readiness of ground-based facilities and the
integrated flight team.
The PSR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Status of previous action item closeouts
- Current approved drawings and specifications, and adequate
definition of the end item, including approved specification
changes and waivers
- Status and documentation of the end item, including all interface
documentation, to ensure that the latest changes have been
incorporated in affected hardware
- Status of test documentation and determination (by review of the
test results) of the adequate and proper testing of the end item
- Documentation to determine the status of the problem/failure
report and evaluate its total impact, particularly with respect to
risk for the mission
- Documentation of the quality assurance history of the end item to
ensure that necessary inspections have been performed and that all
discrepancies have been properly closed out
- Requirements and plans for shipping and handling
- Verification of compliance with safety requirements
- Status and acceptability of the deliverable end-item data package
- Risk assessment
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3.4.5 Design Certification Review (OCR)
The purpose of the OCR is to ensure that the end item has reached
design and developmental maturity through reexamination of the
requirements in light of NASA goals and to certify that the entire system
design meets those requirements. The OCR is always a Level I review, is
chaired by an Associate Administrator, and includes all aspects of the
program — hardware and software, ground and flight operations, and
personnel (e.g., training, risk/contingency, and safety). The OCR
assesses and certifies the design of a hardware or software end item or a
space vehicle for flight worthiness and flight safety, and assesses and
certifies the design of the launch complex, the mission control center,
the space flight network, and launch instrumentation for the associated
mission.
The OCR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Status of previous action items
- Item change data
- Analysis and test documentation
- Reliability documentation
- Analyses of safety and human factors
- Specified requirements derived from mission objectives
- Analysis of previous failures and incidents
- Verification of physical and functional configuration
- Validation of analytical models of the equipment and system
- Validation of the thermal-control design
- Review of hazards control
- Checklist of a safety systems and subsystem including the
following:
— Electrical
— Materials
— Mechanical
— Pressure
— Propulsion
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OCR review items/data checklist (continued)
— Pyrotechnics
— Structures
— Cautions and warnings
— Environmental control
— Cryogenics
— Hydraulics
— Optics
— Human factors
- Training of ground flight personnel
- Operational plans and status
- Mission rules
- Results and status of verification planning, testing, and analysis
for the total system and associated ground support systems
- Deviations from baseline configuration
- Configuration inspection documentation
3.4.6 Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
The purpose of the FRR is to assess the overall readiness of the
total system and the flight, including readiness to achieve all flight
objectives.
The FRR review items/data checklist includes the following:
- Status of previous action item closeouts
- Status of vehicle and launch support facilities, systems,
equipment, range support, launch commit criteria, and personnel
training
- Reports on residual hazards and problems
- Status of operation and maintenance instructions
- Verification of completion of documentation, including the
following:
— Structures
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FRR review items/data checklist (continued)
— Dynamic coupling
— Integrated vehicle control capability
— Staging
— Pyrotechnics
— Safe mission termination
— Radio frequency transmissions
— Weight and center-of-gravity control
— Baseline mission capability
— Payload support requirements
— Ground support equipment and facility safety design
— Ground operations control and monitor capability
— Hydraulic power capability
/
— Emergency egress design capability (as applicable)
— Landing station capability
— Range safety system
— Communications and tracking
- Configuration changes since the previous review
- Hardware and software anomalies
- Limited-life components, life remaining, and age life/time cycle
- Status of logistics readiness (spares support)
- Identification of actual hardware shortages and open work items
- Assessment of safety, reliability, and quality assurance
- Identification of problems that may constrain the flight
- Failures/incidents and accidents reports
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3.5 PAYLOAD CLASSIFICATIONS
The Review Board's chatter should include the classification of any
payload under review. The classification should be determined on the
basis of NASA Management Instruction NHI 8010.1, Classification of NASA
Space Transportation System (STS) Payloads. That document states the
classification of payloads as follows:
- Class A: Minimum Risk. Payloads for which a minimum
risk approach is clearly dictated by prohibitively high
cost of the consequences of failure, or by an
unacceptable combination of costs and intangible factors
associated with failure.
- Class B: Risk/Cost Compromise. Payloads for which an
approach characterized by reasonable compromise between
minimum risks and minimum costs is appropriate due to
the capability to recover from in-flight failure by some
means that is marginally acceptable, even though it
involves significantly high costs and/or highly
undesirable intangible factors.
- Class C: Economically Reflyable or Repeatable.
Payloads for which reflight or repeat flight is planned
as a routine back-up in the event of in-flight soft
failure, and reflight or repeat flight costs are low
enough to justify limiting qualification and acceptance
testing to end-item environment screening. (In addition
to whatever is required for STS safety and compatibility
and payload functional testing.) There is no
significant intangible or tangible impact of soft
failure except the cost of repair and reflight, or
repeat flight which can be estimated with reasonable
confidence and can be directly related to
flight-reliability enhancement costs. Therefore, a
decision criteria of minimum total expected cost is
appropriate and practical.
- Class D: Minimum Single Attempt Cost. Payloads that
have objectives worth achieving at a cost not-to-exceed
the amount required for a single low-cost attempt where
formal verification requirements are limited to those
necessary for safety and compatibility.
A specific payload should be classified as A, B, C, or D as early as
the payload project definition, but no later than the Preliminary
Requirements Review. Early classification of the payload is necessary to
properly apply the NHI 8010.1 requirements. Proper application of the
classification is required to ensure that the end item (payload) will meet
the design specifications at the lowest cost consistent with the stated
level of confidence for the specific end item.
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Headquarters Program Offices are responsible for assigning the
initial payload classifications, and field installations are responsible
for recommending classifications for payloads and payload assemblies and
subassemblies within their area of responsibility. Because NMI 8010.1 is
highly project-oriented, it is appropriate for each center to review this
management instruction in light of individual mission or project
responsibilities. Appendix B presents a discussion of the applicability
of the minimum standard guidelines to payload classifications A, B, C, and
D.
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CHAPTER FOUR
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
4.1 OBSERVATIONS
As a result of our assessment, ARINC Research made the following
observations:
- The NASA centers conduct many different reviews to ensure the
quality and safety of end items.
- The practices and procedures used in conducting reviews follow
similar patterns.
- The terminology used varies somewhat from center to center.
- The detailed documented descriptions of review practices and
procedures vary greatly from center to center. Personnel must
rely on referenced documents to provide the detail lacking in some
of the documents supplied for this study.
- Documents from individual centers do not always clearly describe
an in-depth review process; it was often necessary to refer to a
number of documents to obtain confidence that the review process
has the necessary depth and includes all of the necessary elements.
- Few of the documents supplied indicate an in-depth feedback and
closeout process.
- Some of the documents do not describe procedures of the Review
Board or Team or a review item/data checklist.
- There was little documentation supplied describing the decision
process for determining payload classifications (A, B, C, or D)
and determining the differences in the scope of the reviews for
each classified payload.
- Many reviews are conducted by the persons directly associated with
the end item under review.
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The Review Board chairman is generally directly associated with
the program or project under review.
The review descriptions do not indicate how upper-level Review
Boards or management are advised of action item closeouts, leading
to the assumption that a closeout stops at the level at which it
was approved.
The review descriptions do not indicate a process for moving open
action items to a higher-level review.
The review practices and procedures of the DoD and FAA do not
offer significant areas of improvement to NASA.
4.2 CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of our observations, we reached the following
conclusions:
- A standard format for review practices and procedures, including
standard terminology should be used by all centers.
- A procedure should be devised and implemented for advising a
central office at Headguarters of improvements to the standard
review practices and procedures so that all centers can be kept
fully informed.
- Minimum standard review guidelines promulgated by a central office
at Headguarters should be structured in a manner that allows each
center flexibility in interpreting the standards to meet diverse
mission requirements.
- A procedure should be devised and implemented for advising a
central office at Headquarters of changed review practices and
procedures to meet specific mission requirements.
- The chairman of the Review Board or Team should be selected first
for management ability and second for technical competence; the
chairman should not be directly associated with the program or
project under review.
- The number of persons on the Review Board or Team (including the
chairman) should be an odd number, and should be the minimum
number necessary to satisfy the technical requirements of the
program or project under review. The majority of the members
should be persons not directly associated with the program or
project under review.
- Members of the Review Board or Team should be selected for their
technical competence and ability to communicate effectively.
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- An approval process should be developed foe all changes made under
the standard flight-critical change program. Approval by a
minimum of two persons should be required for changes of the
lowest classification, and approval of a formal Review Board
should be required for changes of the highest level of criticality.
- Each review should begin with a summary of action items from the
previous review together with a short statement of the current
disposition of each action item.
- A specific standard procedure should be developed to evaluate the
qualification of components, subassemblies, or assemblies on the
basis of previous applications or similarity to another component,
subassembly, or assembly.
- The history of similar systems, components, subassemblies, oc
assemblies should be reviewed at the PDR or CDR so as to identify
areas of needed concentrated analysis or review to take advantage
of data regarding previous failures or problem areas.
- When a design change is approved, it may be necessary to review
all subsequent changes related to the approved change or made to
accommodate the approved change.
- One-person reviews or change approval should be avoided.
- Standard procedures and methods should be developed for reviewing
and certifying software. The procedures should include criteria
for identifying the requirements for recertification of software
based on either hardware or software changes.
- The minimum standard review guidelines presented in this report
should be considered for implementation as a NASA management
instruction.
- The minimum standard review guidelines presented in this report
should be used as working papers to solicit comments from all
centers before the guidelines are officially published. A number
of iterations may be necessary to consolidate and coordinate
comments from the centers into the final document.
- An independent third party review may be required for Class A
payloads if the Review Board guidelines do not provide the
required freedom of action which should be expected when the
chairman and over half of the Review Board are not associated with
the project under review.
ARINC Research Corporation recommends that the conclusions detailed
above be considered in the implementation of the minimum standard
guidelines for the NASA Flight Assurance Program.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
A glossary of standard terms should be included as an integral part
of the minimum standard guidelines for the Flight Assurance Review program.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AA-STS:
Acceptance:
Acceptance Test:
Accident/Incident:
Action Assignee:
Action Item:
ADP:
Aerospace Ground Equipment:
Associate Administrator, Space
Transportation System
The act of an authorized representative of
the Government by which the government
assents to its ownership of existing and
identified articles or approves specific
services rendered as partial or complete
performance of the contract.
The environmental, electrical, mechanical,
functional, and other tests that payloads,
spacecraft, subsystems, instruments, and
components scheduled for flight must pass
before launch. These tests are planned to
approximate the expected flight
conditions. They are designed to detect
nonconformances in material and
workmanship.
An unplanned event that results in
personnel fatality or injury or damage to
or loss of equipment, environment, public
property, or private property or that
could result in an unsafe situation or
operational mode. An accident refers to a
major event whereas an incident is a minor
event or episode that could lead to an
accident.
The individual or group given the
responsibility for completing a specific
action item.
A specifically defined problem or set of
problems requiring resolution as
determined by a review board or review
team.
Acceptance Data Package
All equipment required on the ground to
make an aerospace system operational in
its intended environment.
Aerospace Ground Equipment
Approach and Landing Test
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Analysis:
Article:
Assembly:
Associate Contractor
ASSY:
ATE:
Baseline Configuration:
Block Diagram:
A process used in lieu of, or in addition
to, testing to validate compliance of an
item to specification requirements. The
techniques include the use of analytical
models in systems engineering analysis,
statistics and qualitative analyses,
safety analyses, computer and hardware
simulations, and analog modeling.
A unit of hardware or any portion thereof
required by the contract.
A functional subdivision of a component,
consisting of parts or subassemblies that
perform functions necessary for the
operation of the component as a whole
(e.g., regulator assembly, power amplifier
assembly, gyro assembly, primary
structure, boom, and solar array).
Acceptance Review
Airborne Support Equipment
The contractor who under direct contract
to NASA performs work excluded from the
principal contract. The associate
contractor is responsible to the principal
contractor for technical integration of
the (sub) system and must coordinate
technical developments and requirements in
a timely and organized manner. The
associate contractor is directly
responsible to NASA for administrative and
contractual matters.
Assembly
Automatic Test Equipment
The documented and approved design concept
or arrangement of components as
established at a given point in the
procurement cycle for systems or equipment.
A line drawing with block outlines to
designate units or functional groups for
general arrangement studies, functional
explanation, product familiarization, etc.
within a system, set, or item.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Breadboard:
CAR:
Catastrophic Hazard:
CCB:
An assembly of preliminary circuits or
parts used to prove the feasibility of a
device, circuit, system, or principle
without regard to the final configuration
or packaging of the parts.
Configuration and Acceptance Review;
Corrective Action Request.
Everything contained in the shuttle
payload bay, plus other equipment located
elsewhere in the orbiter that is payload-
unique and not carried in the standard
baseline orbiter weight budget, including
payloads and payload support equipments.
A hazard with the potential for personnel
injury or resulting loss of life or for
preventing the safe return to Earth of an
orbiter vehicle.
Configuration Control Board
CEI:
Certificate of Flight
Worthiness:
Certificate of Safety
Compliance:
Configuration Control Panel
Countdown Demonstration Test
Critical Design Review
Contract End Item
The principal record at key milestone
events of an end item's progress.
Certification of flight worthiness
provides the means by which centers,
center end item contractors and NASA Using
Sites certify to end item configuration
and design drawings and specifications,
availability and disposition of required
documentation and compatibility of end
item configuration, launch and orbit
operations documentation.
A formal documented approval through the
safety assessment procedure. Includes a
statement that all safety requirements of
NHB 1700.7 have been met or, if not, what
waivers are applicable.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Cert iCleation;
Checklist:
CI:
CITE:
COPR:
COFW:
Cognizant NASA Installation;
Component:
Conceptual Phase:
Configuration:
Configuration Control:
The approval of an end item, assembly of
parts, soft-ware or system confirming that
the specification requirements have been
met in all respects.
A list of procedures or items summarizing
the activities required for an operator or
technician to perform his duties; a
condensed guide; an on-the-job supplement
to more detailed job instructions.
Configuration Inspection
Cargo Interface Test Equipment
Certification of Flight Worthiness
Certification of Flight Readiness
That major organizatioal unit of NASA
which has direct technical and managerial
responsibility for the system under
contract.
A combination of parts, subassemblies, or
assemblies, usually self-contained, which
performs a distinctive function in the
operation of the overall equipment; a
"black box"
That period in the system life cycle which
usually terminates with publication of a
specific operational requirement.
The technical and physical description
required to fabricate, test, accept,
operate, maintain, and logistically
support systems or equipment.
The systematic definition, evalua-
tion, coordination and disposition of each
proposed change, deviation, or waiver, and
the implementation of each approved change
in the configuration of a
Program/Project/EI after formal
establishment of the configuration
identification.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Configuration Control Board:
Configuration Inspection:
Configuration Management:
Construction Analysis:
Contractor:
Countdown Demonstration
Test - Dry:
The functional body within a Program/
Project/El office responsible for
directing the implementation of baselines,
and the review and disposition of all
changes, deviations, or waivers to these
baselines.
The last of the formal baseline reviews in
which the manager conducts an audit of his
CEI to determine that the "as-built"
documentation is in accordance with its
release engineering, to approve the CEI
specification and to establish the product
configuration baseline.
A discipline applying technical administra-
tive direction and surveillance to:
Identify and document the technical
requirements of a Program/Project/EI.
Control changes/deviations/waivers to
these technical requirements.
Record and report change processing and
implementation status.
An internal inspection for assessing
design, workmanship, assembly, and any
other processing associated with
fabrication of the part.
Any person, partnership, company, or
corporation (or any combination of these)
which is a party to a contract with the
United States Government.
A dress rehearsal, with flight crew
participation, of the Lauch Countdown
operations excluding external tank
propellant loading opertions.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Countdown Demonstration
Test - Wet:
CR:
Critical Design Review:
Critical Hazard:
CRR:
Desion Certification Review
Design criteria:
Design Review:
A full dress rehersal of the launch
countdown operations including cryogenic
propellant loading of the external tank.
Test normally terminates at the time for
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
ignition. Flight crew does not
participate from the vehicle.
Configuration Review
A formal technical evaluation of the
detailed design of an end item or series
of end items to assure that the detailed
design meets the specified requirements
for the end item or end items. This
evaluation may be conducted in one review
or a series of phased reviews as
appropriate for the complexity of the end
item(s).
A hazard with the potential for resulting
in damage to equipment or for requiring
use of contingency or emergency procedures.
Cargo Readiness Review
Deviation Approval Request
Design Engineering
Design Certification Review
Design, Development, Test and Evaluation
A formal comprehensive evaluation of all
hardware and software end items and
elements of a system to assure and certify
that the overall system and the system sub
elements meet the design requirements and
are satisfactory for accomplishment of a
safe and successful mission.
Standards upon which a design is based.
A systematic, technically oriented and
documented evaluation of spacecraft,
experiments, end items and unique support
equipment by a team of specialists.
A-7
Design Review Program:
Design Specification:
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
A systematized and disciplined application
of the broad technical competence of the
contractor and the customer to a product.
The program is intended to improve the
product and to provide assurance to
contractor and customer management, by
formalized documentation of the decision
logic, that the most satisfactory design
has been selected to meet the program
requirements.
A document prescribing criteria to be
satisfied in designing a particular
component, subsystem, or system (or
part). Typical criteria include
performance requirements under specified
environments, interface requirements,
size, weight, ruggedness, safety margins,
derating factors, and apportioned
reliability goal (with definition of
failure)
Designated Representative:
Detail Drawing:
Deviation:
PR:
Drawing Departure
Authorization:
An individual (such as a NASA plant repre-
sentative) , firm (such as an assessment
contractor), or Government agency
designated and authorized by NASA to
perform a specific function(s) relative to
the contractor's reliability effort; e.g.,
monitor-ship, assessment, and design
review participation and/or approval of
certain documents or actions.
Delineates information to describe an item
and shall include materials, finish,
tolerances, and other requirements as
applicable.
A specific authorization, granted before
the fact, to depart from a particular
requirement of specifications or related
documents.
Disposition Record
A form completed by the contractor and
submitted for each noncompliance condition
which requires a departure from the design
requirements set forth in the contractual
Interface Control Document
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End Item:
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Design Review Team
Drawing
Engineering Change
Engineering Development
End Item
Any condition that can result in crew
injury or threat to life and that requires
immediate corrective action, including
predetermined crew response.
A space system or any of its principal
system or subsystem elements; for example,
launch vehicle, spacecraft, ground support
system, propulsion engine, CEI or guidance
system. Also, articles covered by major
subcontracts where NPC 200-2 is invoked by
the NASA installation or by a system prime
contractor. Also, articles which will be
delivered directly to a Government
installation or provided as GFP to a
contractor.
Engineering Change:
Engineering Change Proposal:
Engineering Drawing:
Equipment:
An authorized modification to a baseline.
The method by which a contractor submits a
proposed change to a configuration
baseline for complete assessment by the
procuring activity.
A verifiable engineering delineation
setting forth pictorial or descriptive
language representations or combinations
thereof. Drawings solely for contractor's
processes or plant facilities are not
included.
A separate item designed either to provide
an individual service or function as a
self-contained unit, or to perform a
service or function when used in
conjunction with other devices.
Eastern Space and Missile Center
External Tank
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ETR;
Experiment;
FAL:
Facility:
Feasibility Study:
PEG:
Field Engineering Change:
Flight Readiness Firing:
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
Eastern Test Range
An action or a process undertaken to
confirm or disprove an existing theory and
to obtain data leading to the development
of new theories.
First Approach and Landing
Any fixed installation; e.g., test stand
or launch platform, which is part of a
program/project. This includes Real
Property Installed Equipment (RPIE).
Flight Certification Board
First Captive Flight
The phase during which studies are made of
a proposed item or technique to determine
the degree to which it is practicable,
adviseable, and adaptable for the intended
purpose.
Field Engineering Change
Flight Readiness Review:
The method for expediting make fit/make
operable changes at NASA Using Sites.
A 20-second firing of the Space Shuttle
Main Engines (SSMEs) in a near Shuttle
flight configuration on the launch pad,
with a scheduled cutoff prior to Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) ignition and liftoff,
to be conducted (one-time-only) as part of
the CDDT.
The last major evaluation prior to a launch
conducted as a consolidated review of the
hardware, software, operational and
support elements to assure readiness to
begin the mission. The result of this
evaluation, shortly before launch, is a
positive certification of flight readiness
by both government and contractor.
First Manned Captive Flight
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
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PRP:
PER:
GFE:
GFP:
GHI:
GOR:
Ground Support Equipment:
GLOSSARY OF TERM3 (contd.)
Plight Readiness Firing
Flight Readiness Review
Government Furnished Equipment
Government Furnished Property
Goddard Management Instruction
Ground Operations Review
GSE:
GSFC:
H&SEO:
Hazard;
ICD:
Installation Drawing:
Interface:
Interface drawing:
Nonflight equipment, implements, and
devices required for the handling,
servicing, inspection, testing,
maintenance, alignment, adjustment,
checking, repairing, and overhauling of an
operational end time or a subsystem or
component part thereof. This may include
equipment required to support another item
of GSE.
Ground Support Equipment
Goddard Space Flight Center
Health and Safety Engineering Office
The presence of a potential-risk situation
caused by an unsafe act or condition.
Interface Control Drawing
Shows general configurations, attaching
hardware, and information to locate,
position, and mount an item relative to
fixed points and to other items.
The point or area where a relationship
exists between two or more parts, systems,
programs, persons, or procedures wherein
physical and functional compatibility is
required.
The engineering drawing which graphically
or descriptively displays the conditions
of the interface which exist between
assemblies.
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Integration:
Launch Integrity Team:
Launch Vehicle:
LIT:
LHB:
LMI:
L-2 Davi
LO:
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (contd.)
The process of assuring that the major
elements of a program be conceived,
designed, assembled, tested, operated, and
documented in such a manner as to be
compatible with each other and to satisfy
the program objectives.
JSC Ground Systems
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Management Instruction
Kennedy Program Directive
Kennedy Space Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Review team composed of high-level
representatives of the prime contractor,
or the integration contractor and the
major associates, to review each Launch
Vehicle prior to the customer
flight-readiness review.
The part of the space vehicle which
furnishes the propulsion and guidance
during the inital part of the trajectory
to provide the prescribed velocity,
position, and attitude required for
injection into the desired trajectory.
Launch vehicles are commonly called
boosters and consist of two or more
propulsive stages.
Launch Integrity Team.
Langley Handbook
Langley Management Instruction
Launch Minus 2 Days
Launch Operations
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LRR:
LRU:
LVP:
Han-Rated Space Vehicle:
HATCO:
MCR:
Milestone:
Mission:
Mission Task:
HHH:
HHI:
Modification:
Modification Instructions:
MR:
MRB:
MSFC:
Launch Readiness Review
Line Replaceable Unit
Launch Vehicle Project
Space vehicles for manned flight which
have achieved the standards of performance
and reliability previously established as
reasonably acceptable for this class of
equipment.
Material Analysis Tracking and Control
Master Change Record
Any significant event in the design and
development of a space system or in the
associated program or project which is
used as a control point for measurement of
progress and effectiveness or for planning
or redirecting future effort.
The performance of a coherent set of
investigations or operations to achieve
program goals.
The specified purpose for which a device
must perform.
Marshall Management Manual
Marshall Management Instruction
An identified, approved and contractually
authorized change to systems/equipment and
spares already accepted by the Government.
A form initiated by the contractor to be
used as a checklist for modification kit
completeness and to serve as instruction
for accomplishment of the modification.
Material review disposition
Material Review Board
Marshall Space Flight Center
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NASA:
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
NDE:
NHB:
NHI:
Nonstandard Part:
Normal STS Mission Phases:
NSS:
NSSDC:
O&C:
O&H:
OPT:
OHA:
OHD:
OKI:
Operational:
Operational Phase:
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Civilian agency with research and
development jurisdiction in aeronautical
and space activities, except those
activities peculiar to and primarily
associated with the development of weapons
systems and military operations.
Non-Destructive Evaluation
NASA Handbook
NASA Management Instruction
One for which no published standard or
specification exists
All portions of the mission to be
performed by the STS, excluding STS abort
and emergency landing.
NASA Safety Standard
National Space Science Data Center
Operations and Checkout
Operations and Maintenance
Orbital Flight Test
Operations Hazards Analysis
Operation and Maintenance Documentation
Operation and Maintenance Instruction
Equipment for which all research and
development has been completed with
achievement of performance objectives.
The period from acceptance by the user of
the first operating unit until disposition
of the system equipment. The operational
phase overlaps the acquisition phase.
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Operations and Maintenance
Instruction:
PASS:
Payload:
Payload Bay:
Payload Elements:
Organized step-by-step procedural
information specifying methods of
operating and maintaining flight hardware
and support equipment. OMIs are used in
the performance of day-to-day operations
and maintenance tasks.
Orbiter Project Office
Office of Planning and Review
Office of Space Transportation Systems
Orbiter Vehicle
Project Approval Document
One piece or two or more pieces joined
together which are not normally subject to
disassembly without destruction.
Planning and Scheduling System
A specific complement of instruments,
space equipment, and support hardware and
software carried into space by one shuttle
flight to achieve specific objectives (not
considered part of the basic STS itself).
The 15-foot diameter by 60-foot long
enclosed volume within the orbiter,
designed to carry carriers, payloads,
payload-support equipment, and associated
mounting hardware.
Instruments, support equipment, software,
or other individual payload items that are
subsets of an integrated cargo complement.
Program Development Plan
Preliminary Design Review
Program Evaluation and Review Technique
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Piggyback Experiment:
PIP:
PH:
Preliminary Design Reviews:
Program:
Program Evaluation and
Review Technique:
Program/Project
Requirements Review:
Project:
An experiment which rides along with the
primary experiment on a space-available
basis without interfering with the mission
of the primary experiment.
Payload Integration Plan
Program Management
A formal technical evaluation of the
proposed design approach to an end item.
It is conducted prior to the detailed
design or very early in the detailed
design phase to asure that the engineering
approach is acceptable. As a general rule
this evaluation is conducted when the
design layouts are 95% completed and the
detailed design is 10% completed.
A related series of undertakings designed
to accomplish a broad scientific or
technical goal. Attainment of such
long-range goals may be accomplished by
implementation of specific projects.
Method of charting events and obtaining
predicted performance in accordance with a
schedule.
The first of the major baseline reviews,
in which the Program/Project Manager
assures that the mission objectives and
technical reguirements of his
specification are fully understood and can
be met based on the concepts selected for
each El/major element and that the
Program/Project Requirements Baseline is
established.
A scheduled undertaking, within a program,
which may involve the research and
development, design, construction, and
operation of system and associated
hardware, or hardware only, to accomplish
a scientific or technical objective.
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PRR:
PSO:
QAL
QAI:
Qua1ifloation Tests:
R&QA:
Released Engineering:
Retrofit:
RID:
SAA:
Safety:
Preliminary Requirements Review
Project Safety Officer
Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance Instructions
Tests intended to demonstrate that the
design will function within performance
specifications under simulated conditions
more severe than those expected from
ground handling, launch, and orbital
operations. Their purpose is to uncover
deficiencies in design and method of
manufacture. They are not intended to
exceed design safety margins or to
introduce unrealistic modes of failure.
Reliability and Quality Assurance
The current and total set of approved
drawings and specifications which have
been completed for a product and formally
recorded. It is centrally controlled and,
upon release, represents the engineering
requirement to which all contractor
disciplines applicable to that product
must adhere in order to meet contract
requi cements.
The incorporation of an engineering change
in accepted or in-service items.
Review Item Disposition
Real Property Installed Equipment
Requirements Review
Systems Assurance Analysis
Freedom from chance of personnel injury or
fatality and damage to or loss of
equipment or property.
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Safety Analysis:
Safety Critical:
Schematic Diagram:
SFP:
Single Failure Point:
Space Shuttle:
Space System:
Space Transportation System:
Spacecraft:
A process used in lieu of, or in addition
to, testing to validate compliance of an
item to specification requirements. The
techniques include the use of analytical
models in systems engineering analyses,
safety analyses, statistics and
qualitative analyses, computer and
hardware simulations, and analog modeling.
Systems or subsystems whose inadvertent
operation or failure to operate results in
either a critical or catastrophic hazard.
A diagrammatic drawing that shows function
symbols with interconnections to
illustrate circuit operation. It does not
necessarily identify physical location of
components or connections between them.
Single Failure Point
A single element of hardware, where
failure would lead directly to loss of
life, vehicle, or mission. When safety
considerations dictate that an abort be
initiated when a redundant element fails,
the element is also considered a SFP.
The orbiter, solid-rocket boosters, and
external tank.
A system of equipment consisting of launch
vehicle(s), spacecraft, ground support
equipment, and test hardware, used in
ground testing, launching, operating, and
maintaining space vehicles or spacecraft.
An integrated system consisting of the
Space Shuttle (Orbiter, External Tank,
Solid Rocket Booster, and Flight Kits),
Upper Stages, Spacelab, and any associated
flight/ground hardware and software.
Systems, manned or unmanned, that are
designed to be placed into a orbital
trajectory, orbit about the Earth, or a
trajectory to another celestial body.
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SP&R:
SR&QA:
SRB:
SSME:
System:
TRR:
TSPD:
UA:
Validation:
VCR:
Verification:
Safety Policy and Requirements
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Main Engines
Space Transportation System
The NASA Headquarters/STS Operations
Directorate is the STSoperator. NASA/JSC
is the STS flight operator and is
responsible for the safety of payload
flight systems and flight operations.
One of the principal functioning entities
comprising the project hardware and
related operational services within a
project or flight mission. Ordinarily, a
system is the first major subdivision of
project work. Similarly, a subsystem is a
major functioning entity within a system.
(A system may also be an organized and
disciplined approach to accomplish a task;
e.g., a failure-reporting system.)
Test Readiness Review
Technology & Space Program Development
Unexplained Anomoly
The inspection and tests necessary to
establish confidence for a system added or
to restore confidence in a system
invalidated by the installation of a
modification into a Contract End Item.
Vehicle Configuration Review
Determination by analysis, inspection,
test or a combination of- the three that a
product can function as intended in a
particular mission; this includes
assurance that the product design has been
qualified and that each product item has
met acceptance criteria.
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Verification Procedure: A document that implements one or more
specific activities required by the
verification plan. The verification
procedure describes details of each
activity such as instrumentation, data
collection, and reporting. It includes
provisions for safety and contamination
control that are associated with the test
being conducted.
Waiver: A written authorization accepting a
departure, after occurrence,from a
baseline requirement, normally limited to
a single application of GBI.
MBS: Work Breakdown Structure
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APPENDIX B
NASA DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
This appendix contains a list of the supplied NASA documents reviewed
In this study. It also contains a list of the FAA and DoD documents
reviewed.
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AMES RESEARCH CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE AND DATE
AHB 1700-1 AMES Health & Safety Manual
Chapter 5: Facility Operational Safety
Chapter 9: Aviation Safety
Chapter 10: Pressure System Safety
No Date
AHB 1710-3 Certification and Recertification of
Ground Based Pressure Vessels and
Pressurized Systems - June 1981
AHB 1740-2 Outline for Airworthiness and Flight
Safety Reviews - January 1975
AMM 1740-1 Management Manual
Airworthiness and Flight Safety Reviews
February 18, 1975
AMM 1760-1 Management Manual
Man-Rating of Simulators
September 19, 1980
AMM 1770-1 Management Manual
Project Safety Reviews of Major
(Discrete) Construction of Facility
Modification
September 19, 1980
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GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE AND DATE
GMI 1700.3 Management Instruction
System Safety for Flight Projects
September 8, 1981
GMI 5330.7 Management Instruction
Development and Implementation of
Environmental Verification Requirements
for Space Flight Hardware
December 9, 1979
GMI 8010.IB Management Instruction
Spacecraft Design Review Program
March 22. 197
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JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER
JPL D-363
OER 82-4
1-28
MJS77-RLH-76-09
PD618-210
PD618-223
JPL-750-150
TITLE AND DATE
Guidelines for Planning and Conduct of
Formal and Informal Reviews
February 7, 1983
Policy
Work Output and Proposal Review Policy
August 28, 1978
Hardware Reviews - April 19, 1976
Project Document
Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977
Spacecraft Procurement Instructions
January 10, 1974
Project Document
Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977
Spacecraft System Review Program
April 15, 1975
Flight Experiment Requirements and
Guidelines
July 1981
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JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER
LA2
LA3-82-059
LC-82-224
JSC07700
None
None
None
JSC-16898
JSC-17453
JSC-14046
None
TITLE AND DATE
Space Shuttle Program
System Integration
Flight Readiness Review Planning
October 8. 1980
Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and
L-2 Day Review
September 23, 1982
Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and
L-2 Day Review Revised
September 23. 1982
Configuration Verification, Volume IV
No Date
Space Shuttle Program
Orbital Flight Test Design Certification
Review Plan
December 21, 1978
Space Shuttle Flight Readiness Review Plan
February 26, 1982
Space Shuttle Vehicle
Configuration Review (VCR) Plan
March 15, 1982
Space Shuttle Orbiter Flight Readiness
Review Plan, Orbital Flight Test Plan
Revision A
June 1981
Space Shuttle Orbiter Configuration
Verification Review Plan, Operational
Orbiter Vehicles
September 1981
Payload Verification Reguicements
March 1982
Space Shuttle Orbiter Review Plan
Preliminary Design Review
Critical Design Review
January 11, 1974
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NUMBER
JSC 16898
JSC 08117
Rev. B
None
JSC 11758
JSC 13830
TITLE AND DATE
Space Shuttle Orbiter Flight Readiness
Review Plan, Orbital Flight Test STS-1
September 1980
Space Shuttle Program
Procedure for Certification of Flight
Readiness
Hay 17. 1978
Space Shuttle Program
System Integration, Flight Readiness
Review Planning
October 8, 1980
Orbiter Flight Readiness Review Plan for
Approach and Landing Test
November 1976
Implementation Procedure for STS
Payloads, System Safety Requirements
Hay 1979
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KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER
DE-ID8020. 1A
K-SM-04.8.3
KPD 8620.5
TITLE AND DATE
Implementing Directive
Design Engineering Shuttle Transportation
System Readiness Review Cycle
September 15, 1981
STS-3 and Subs
Readiness Review Management Plan
March 1982
Program Directive
Space Transportation System Flight
Readiness Reviews
August 7, 1979
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LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE AND DATE
1710.1 Management Manual
Human Factors Research
Man-Rating Requirement,and Committee
Review Procedures
June 22, 1977
LHB 7121.1 Announcement
Langley Proposals for New Starts
May 9, 1977
LHB 7121 Project Management, Handbook
December 1975
LMI 7000.2 Management Manual
Review Program for Major Construction,
Rehabilitation, and Modification Projects
of Research Facilities
March 26, 1981
LMI 7120.1 Management Manual
Aeronautic and Space Flight Projects and
Experiments Review Program
October 21. 1980
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LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER
01-14 Rev. 4
01-19 Rev. 2
01-20 Rev. 2
01-22 Rev. 2
01-23 Rev. 3
01-24 Rev. 3
01-28 Rev. 1
01-30 Rev. 1
None
TITLE AND DATE
Operating Instruction
ATLAS/CENTAUR Launch Vehicle Hardware and
Software Review Milestones
July 1. 1980
Operating Instruction - 19
LVD Procedure for Review and Disposition
of Launch Vehicle System Quality Problems
July 1, 1980
Operating Instruction - 20
Launch Vehicle Division Critical Problem
List
July 1. 1980
Operating Instruction - 22
System Engineer's Duties and
Responsibilities
July 1, 1980
Operating Instruction -.23
Launch Vehicles Division Engineering
Review Board (ERB)
July 1. 1980
Operating Instruction - 24
Processing of Changes to the Centaur
Unified Test Plan (UTP)
July 1980
Operating Instruction - 28
Processing of Software Change Sheets
July 1. 1980
Operating Instruction - 30
Unscheduled Removal of Atlas/Centaur
Flight Hardware after Vehicle Erection
Aircraft Operations Manual
Appendix B, Aircraft Operations Safety
Assurance Plan - No Date
Appendix C, Flight Workorder Control
System - No Date
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MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE AND DATE
MM 2314.2 Data Management Manual
MSFC Data Management
Operating Procedures
March 15, 1972
MMI 8010.5 Management Instruction
MSFC Baseline Design Review
July 7, 1980
MMI 8030.2A Management Instruction
Policy on MSFC Payloads
March 4, 1980
MM 8040.12A Standard Contractor
Configuration Management Requirements
MSFC Programs
March 3, 1981
MMI 8040.15B Management Instruction
Configuration Management
May 12. 1976
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NASA HEADQUARTERS
DOCUMENTS
NUMBER
E-885-83-01
SP-6502
ESA Contract N°
4846/81/NL/PP(SC)
NHI7121.1C
None
None
1700.7A
403-174-001
None
None
None
None
None
None
TITLE AND DATE
Prelaunch, Mission Operation Report
Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS)
Launch - January 3. 1983
Elements of Design Review for Space
Systems
A Comprehensive Study on Project Review
Techniques Final Report - December 31,
1982
Management Instruction - Planning and
Approval of Major Research and
Development Projects - March 24. 1977
ST-S-5 EMU Interim Report to the
Independent Anomaly Review Team -
December 17, 1982
Certification Process: Lithium Batteries
December 17, 1982
Safety Policy and Requirements for
Payloads Us ing the Space T ranspo rtat ion
System (STS) - December 9. 1980
Safety Reviews - No Date
Certification Review Process January 3,
1983
Design Certification Review of New
Designs for STS-5 and STS-6 - December
22. 1982
Outline - STS Payload Project Review
Guidelines - June 10, 1979
An Independent Review of the Flight
Certification Program - No Date
Space Transportation Systems (STS)
Certification Review - November 13. 1979
Charter - Special Staff to the Chief
Engineec - No Date
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NUMBER TITLE AND DATE
NHI 8010.1 Classification of NASA Space
Transportation System (STS) Payloads -
September 26, 1979
NHB5300.4(1B) Reliability and Quality Assurance
Publication Quality Program Provisions
for Aeronautical and Space System
Contractors - April 1969
NHB5300.4UA) Reliability and Quality Assurance
Publication Reliability Program
Provisions for Aeronautical and Space
System Contractors - April 1970
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DoD DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
NUMBER
AR70-37
NAVMAT INST 4130.1A
MCO 4130.1A
APR 65-3
DSAR 8250.4
NAS/CSS 80-14
DNA INST 5010.18
APR 800-2
AFR 57-1
MIL-STD-480A
MIL-STD-481A
TITLE AND DATE
Configuration Management
July 1. 1974
Acquisition Program Management
August 13, 1982
Statement of Operational Need (SON)
June 12, 1979
Configuration Control-Engineering Changes
Deviations and Waivers '
December 29, 1978
Configuration Control-Engineering Changes
Deviations and Waivers (Short Form)
October 18, 1972
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FAA DOCUMENTS
TITLE AND DATE
Type Certification
December 21, 1967
Reprint October 1978
Includes Changes 1 through 22
FAA Aviation Regulations, Change 3,
Part 25 - Airworthiness Standards:
Transport Category Airplanes
February 10, 1977
Southern Region FAA Flight Standards
Division Application Guide for Obtaining
Supplemental Type Certificate
March 5, 1965
8110.21 Supplemental (Type) Certificate (STC)
Approvals, "One Aircraft Only"
September 22, 1976
8110.IOC FAA Approvals of Major Modifications/
Alterations
January 30, 1978
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APPENDIX C
NASA DOCUMENTS REFERENCED
This appendix contains a list of the NASA documents referenced in one
or more of the documents supplied for review.
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NASA DOCUMENTS REFERENCED
NMI 7121.1, "Planning and Approval of Major Research and
Development Projects"
NHB 7121.4, "Guidelines for Project Planning"
LMI 1710.1, "Human Factors Research, Man-Rating Requirements,
and Committee Review Procedures"
LHB 7121.1, "Project Management"
MM 8040.12 "Standard Contractor Configuration Management
Requirements"
MMI 8030.2 "Policy on MSFC Payloads"
MMI 8040.15 "Configuration Mangement"
MM 2314.2 "MSFC Data Management Operation Procedures"
KMI 2530.4, "Transcription, Monitoring, Interception, or
Recording or Telephone or other Conversations, or the
Proceedings of Meetings"
KMI 5310.9B, "Safety Hazard and Reliability Analyses of Ground
Support Equipment and Facilities, and Launch Operations
Operational and Integrated Hazards Analyses"
OSTS "Space Shuttle Flight Test Operations Directive,"
Revision C, dated January 1979
KPD 8010.2A. "Certificate of Flight Readiness Sign-off for KSC"
KSC KPD 8620.5, STS Flight Readiness Reviews
K-SM-04.8.2, STS-2 Readiness Review Management Plan
K-SM-04.8.1, STS-1 Readiness Review Management Plan
GMI 8010.IB Design Review Program, March 22, 1973
NHB 5300.4(3A) Requirements for Soldered Electrical Connections
NHB 5300.4(18) Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and
Space System Contractors
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. NHB 5300.4(1A); Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical
April 1970 and Space Systems Contractors (Applies only as
defined in 612-16)
. NHB 5300.4(1C) Inspection System Provisions for Suppliers of
Space Materials, Parts, Components and Service
. JSC-14046 "Payload Verification Requirements" March 1982
. NHB 1700.7A "Safety Policy and Requirements - For Payloads Using
the STS" December 9, 1980
. JSC-07700, "Configuration Management Requirements" Jan. 31, 1981
Vol. IV
"Space Shuttle Program Orbital Flight Test Design
Certification Review Plan" December 21, 1978
"Space Shuttle Flight Readiness Review Plan"
February 15, 1980
. WC2/80-308 "JSC Document No. 16898, Space Shuttle Flight
Letter Readiness Review Plan for Orbital Flight Test,
STS-1" September 29, 1980
. JSC-16898 "Space Shuttle Orbiter Flight Readiness Review Plan"
September 1980
"Space Shuttle Program System Integration Flight
Readiness Review Planning" October 8, 1980
"Space Shuttle Flight Readiness Review Plan"
February 26, 1982
"Space Shuttle Vehicle Configuration Review (VCR) Plan
March 15, 1982
. LC-82-224 "Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and L-2 Day Review"
Letter September 23, 1982
"Space Shuttle Flight Readiness Review Plan"
September 1, 1982
. LA3-82-059 "Flight Readiness Review (FRR) and L-2"
September 23, 1982
C-3
NASA DOCUMENTS REFERENCED (contd.)
NMI 1052.12A. "NASA-DOD Agreement foe Performance of Contract
Administration and Contract Audit Services in Support of NASA
Contracts"
NHB 1200.1, "Basic Management Processes"
NHB 1700.l(vi), "Basic Safety Requirements"
NPD 2220.3, "Relationship Between Scientific Investigations Under
Contract to NASA and NASA Contract Monitors"
NHB 2410.1A, Management Procedures for ADP Equipment"
2570.3, "Radio Frequency Management Manual"
5100.2, "NASA Procurement Regulations"
5101.1A, "Requirements for Legal Review of Procurement Matters"
5101.19, "Avoiding Conflict-of-interest Situations in Placing of
NASA Contracts"
NMI 5103.4B, "Source Selections by the Administrator in
Competitive Procurements"
NMI 5104.1, "NASA Policy and Procedures for Use of Contracts for
Nonpersonal Services"
NHB 5104.3A, "DOD and NASA Incentive Contracting Guide"
5104.4, "Cost Plus Award Fee Contracting Guide"
NPD 5300.7A, "Basic Policy on Safety and Reliability and Quality
Assurance"
NHB 5300.4(1A), "Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical
and Space System Contractors
NHB 5600.2, "Statements of Work Handbook"
NHB 5610.1, "Handbook for Preparation of Work Breakdown
Structures"
NPD 7000.1A, "Authorization and Control of Agency Programs and
Allocation of Resources"
NHB 7100.5B, "Launch Vehicle Estimating Factors for Advance
Mission Planning"
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NMI 7100.11. "Announcement of Opportunity Process - Acquisition
and Administration of Space Science Investigations"
NMD/A 7110.1A, "To Approve Advanced Studies of Possible
Aeronautical and Space Missions"
NMI 7121.IB, "Planning and Approval of Major Research and
Development Projects"
NHB 7121.2, "Phased Project Planning Guidelines"
NHB 8030.4G, "Space Flight Payload Capability"
NMI 8030.5, "Submission and Selection of Advanced Research and
Technology Space Flight Experiments"
NHB 8030.6, "Guidelines for Acquisition of Investigations"
NPD 8621.1A, Investigation of Accidents and Mission Failures"
NHB 9090.6, "Guidelines for Evaluation of Contractor Accounting
Systems"
9501.2A, "Procedures for Contractor Reporting of Correlated Cost
and Performance Data"
LHB 1700.1, "Safety Program"
LHB 1700.6, "Control of Hazardous Materials"
LHB 2310.1, "Resource Management System"
LMI 5000.2, "Procurements"
LHB 5000.2, "Basic procurement Guide"
LMI 5300.1, "LRC Reliability and Quality Assurance Management"
LMI 700.2, "Reviews of Major Construction or Facility
Modification Projects"
LHB 7100.1, "Research and Development Program Management
Procedures"
LMI 7100.3, "Procedures for the Use of Purchase Requests in
Research and Development Procurements"
.MI 7120.1, "Review of Small Flight Projects and Experiments"
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LMI 7120.2, "Authority and Respnsibilities of Managers of Small
Space Flight Projects"
LMI 9100.1, "Job Orders"
LMI 9500.1, "Contractor Financial Management Reporting"
SP-6501, "An Introduction to the Evaluatio of Reliability Program"
SP-6502, "Elements of Design Review for Space Systems"
SP-6505, "Parts and Materials Application Review for Space
Systems"
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APPENDIX D
REVIEW DESCRIPTIONS
This appendix contains a description of different reviews shown in
selected documents supplied foe the seven (7) centers. The centers are
not called out by name since it was not the purpose of this review to
audit the current documentation of individual centers. The method of
presentation varies since the information shown is extracted directly from
the documents supplied. The general format of the review descriptions
follows:
- Procedures: procedures followed in organizing and conducting
reviews.
- Personnel: personnel making up the Review Board.
- Responsibilities: responsibilities of the Review Board personnel.
- Review Items/Data; items and data to be reviewed by the review
board for the specific review as called for in the review agenda.
- Feedback: description of the method for informing the review
board of actions taken on all action items.
- Closeout: description of the method described for closing-out
actions items.
D-l
CENTER NO.1
REVIEWS
DOCUMENT NO. 1-1
D-3
CENTER NO. 1
DOCUMENT NO, 1-1
PROCEDURES
Formal Reviews are conducted when the work or p. oposal exhibits one
or more of the following characteristics:
The activity represents a large dollar volume in a given fiscal
year or in total
The products are highly visible deliverables
Success or failure to produce will impact important future
assignments
The conduct of the activity involves matters of substantial
institutional concern
The activity reports directly to an Assistant Laboratory
Director
The activity is one for which an Assistant Laboratory Director
or Deputy Laboratory Director is the convening authority
Criteria for the large dollar volume are arbitrarily recommended as
being expenditures in excess of $1,000,000 in a given fiscal year or
$3,000,000 in total resources for all fiscal years. The judgment as
to whether or not tasks require formal reviews is left to the
responsible organization.
Standing Review Boards are selected for projects or tasks which have
a high level of activity and resource requirements. Selection of
board members by the convening authority is generally made from
senior JPL technical and management staff. Supplemental technical
or management supporting members or advisors may be added to the
board as required by circumstances. If the review board is to
function over the lifetime of a project it is advisable to select
extra board members and rotate to cover needs.
Review Plans. Early in the life of a project or task, or as soon as
a proposal is initiated, a Review Plan should be prepared which
identifies all reviews, their schedules, and the make-up of the
review boards. The Plan should also indicate for each specified
review the purpose, the convening authority, and the methodology.
For tasks which will conduct informal reviews, the Proposal Phase
Checklist ' is recommended.
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DOCUMENT NO. 1-1
PROCEDURES fcont»d)
Convening Authority. For major flight projects such as Voyager and
Galileo, the reviews are classified according to level of importance
(^see^ PEr625-7)." The convening authority is normally the Program
^'Manager"or the Assistant Laboratory Director of the cognizant
Program Office for level 1 reviews; the Project Manager for level 2,
and the cognizant System Manager for level 3 reviews. For all other
reviews the convening authority is the official next in line above
the manager of the activity being reviewed. The responsibilities
and functions of the convening authority are given in Section 4J..
Formal Reviews. A written charter is issued by the convening
authority to identify the scope and objective of the review. This
charter includes board members, review agenda, location, and a
timetable for review activities. The charter also includes the
specific functions the board is to address.
Formal Reviews. The convening authority names the board chairman
and, assisted by the board chairman and Project, System, or Task
Manager, names the review board members. The board must include
a majority number of individuals not performing or managing the work
being reviewed. The chairman appoints the board secretary.
formal Reviews. Background information and review presentation
material of use to the board members should be distributed to the
review board members early enough to enable them to examine it prior
to the meeting.
informal Reviews are conducted according to the needs of the project
or task and they are based on the decision of the convening
authority. Informal reviews should include the following minimum
characteristics:
An assigned chairman
A review board which includes at least one individual who is
not managing or performing the work being reviewed
A presentation of the material being reviewed
Assigning, tracking, and closing action items
By this definition meetings related to technical discussions and
decisions, periodic resource expenditure and project or task status,
and progress monitoring are not necessarily reviews.
the convening authority is the official next in line above
the manager of the activity being reviewed.
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informal Review Minimum Lew»i. A board chairman and a review board,
including at least one individual not managing or performing the
work being reviewed is named by the convening authority.
Preparation. When technical issues are to be included it is
sometimes advisable to prereview with technical specialists and make
results available to the review board,
informal Review. Presentations using existing documentation such as
drawings and reports may be adequate. Prepared material such as
viewgraphs should be provided to the review board and meeting
attendees if used,
informal Review. Background information and review presentation
material of use to the board members should be distributed to the
review board members early enough to enable them to examine it prior
to the meeting.
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PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Convening Authority. The responsibilities of the convening
authority are to:
Determine whether a review will be formal or informal
Appoint the review board chairman and review board menbers
Issue the charter describing the scope, authority, and purpose
of the review
Review and accept or reject the review board findings and
recommendations
Report board findings to Deputy Director if appropriate
Approve the cognizant manager's response to the review board
report
Approve closure of action items, including responsibility for
transmital to board secretary
Cognizant Manager. The responsibilities of the cognizant manager(Project, System, or Task) are to:
Recommend board chairman and review board candidates to the
convening authority
Contribute to the generation of the review charter
Ensure that the review data package is adequate and is
distributed on schedule
Support the review board chairman in developing the review
agenda
Recommend to the convening authority disposition of the
findings and recommendations of the board
Approve and impose the action items that are generated
Prepare for the convening authority's approval the written
response to the board's report, including how action items will
be handled
Monitor the action item status and report close out of action
items to convening authority
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Board QvMrnan- The responsibilities of the board chairman ace to:
Establish an agenda, assisted by the cognizant manager, to
include all information relevant to the purpose of the review
Specify the date and location of review meetings
Identify any unique or specific objectives, constraints, or
goals of review meetings
Appoint a secretary
Chair the review and keep it on subject and on schedule
Convene the review board as required to deliberate, and arrive
at findings and recommendations
Develop, where necessary, a consensus of findings of the board,
including an assessment of the risk associated with problem
areas; develop recommendations for action
Ensure that a written report of findings, including
recommendations for actions, is submitted on a timely basis to
the convening authority with a copy to the cognizant manager
and the Office of Engineering and Review
Approve action item closure prior to distribution to board
menbers
Board Secretary. The responsibilities of the secretary are to:
Record comments of the board members
Assist the chairman in preparing the board report
Maintain a file of all board actions, including closure
memoranda
Maintain a list of action item closures and due dates for
outstanding actions items
Board Members. The responsibilities of the review board members are
to:
Become familiar with the documentation and presentation
material and with the objectives and criteria for assessment
and evaluation prior to the review
Participate in all scheduled meetings and contribute to the
fulfillment of the objectives of the review board
Assist in developing a disposition for the material reviewed,
make recommendations for action, and contribute to the review
board report - - -
*^ • D-8
CENTER NO. 1
DOCUMENT NO. 1-1
PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES (cont'd)
Provide signature approval of the board report or prepare a
minority report
Review Presenters. The responsibilities of persons assigned to make
presentations at each review are to:
Assemble the data package for the review, including appropriate
documents, and provide handouts of the oral presentation
material and supplementary data as required
Make the oral presentation and respond to questions
Assist the cognizant manager in defining action itens
Follow up and respond in writing on action itens assigned
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Project Requirements Review. As is the case with other level 2
project reviews, the Requirements Review is formal and normally
conducted by the standing Project Review Board.
Purpose. TO assure that the project objectives (particularly the
science objectives for a flight project) have been properly
translated into definite and unambiguous statements of requirements;
and to assure that the impact of these requirements on the design of
the major project elements and systems is sufficiently well
understood that trade-offs between requirements and constraints can
be properly made.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Mission objectives
o Science objectives
o Mission design criteria
o Project policy and requirements
o Management structure
o Constraints
o Risk assessment
Preliminary Mission and Systems Review.
Purpose. To assure that an adequate beginning has been made in
designing the project systems to meet mission and science
objectives.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Final draft of the Project Requirements document
o Preliminary design documentation of the leading project system
and conceptual designs of the other systems
o Design approach
o System interfaces and constraints
o Developments required
o Project/systems block diagrams
o Satisfaction of mission and science objectives
o Problems and areas of concern
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REIEW AMD REVIEW ITEMS/DATA (cont'd)
Purpose. To ensure that the scope, resources, and schedule for the
effort are compatible, that the technical direction and management
structure are clearly understood and viable, and that any unusual
circumstances or problems are identified.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Scope of effort
o Schedule of definition phase activities with all critical
milestones
o Cost plan, by month
o Workforce loading plan, by month
o Procurements (studies, consultants)
o Management structure
o Identification of key personnel
o Memoranda of Understanding with supporting Divisions
o Proposed costing methods to be used in developing that portion
of the Task Implementation Plan
o Breadboard plans (if any)
o Plans for tracking resource expenditure and technical
activities during definition phase
o Risk assessment
Review.
Purpose. To evaluate the adequacy of the draft plans, assess the
state of readiness to proceed into the implementation phase, examine
the validity of the costs presented, and recommend any changes to
the plans prior to their release.
REVIEW ITEMS
o The results of studies carried out during the definition phase
o The results of trade-offs carried out during the definition
phase
o The results of at least two different costing methods(detailed, analogy, model, or contractor quotations)
o The. reconciliation of the differences between the results
obtained from the costing methods
o Any changes to the proposal risk assessment memorandum (flight
experiments)
o Any changes to the proposal exceptions memorandum (flight
experiments)
o The functional requirements document draft
o The task implementation plan draft
o Risk assessment
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REVIEW AND REVIEW ITEMS/DATA (cont'd)
Purpose. To assess all aspects of the Implementation Plan and to
recommend remedial action, if necessary prior to its approval and
implementation.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Final draft of the Implementation Plan
o Any changes in cost plans imposed by the actual funding
provided by the sponsor at the initiation of the implementation
phase
o Any changes in the scope imposed by the sponsor from the
proposal or definition phase
o Any changes in the schedule imposed by the sponsor
o Any changes to the proposal risk assessment memorandum (flight
experiments)
o Listing of exceptions to requirements of JPL Document 750-150(flight experiments)
o Implementation organization and staffing
o Schedule and resource plans including reserves and contingency
plans
o Test and training plans, criteria, deliverables, and methods
o Compliance with or waiver from all standards
o Risk assessment
o Plans for reserve utilization
If no Definition Results Review has been conducted, the following
additional itans are presented:
o The results of any studies carried out after the submission of
the proposal or definition phase results
o The results of any trade-offs carried out after the submission
of the proposal or definition phase results
o The results of at least two different costing methods
(detailed, analogy, model, or contractor quotations)
o The reconciliation of the differences between the results
obtained from the costing methods
User Requirements Review. This review is analogous with the project
Requirements Review, and may also be conducted during the definition
phase.
Purpose. To demonstrate that the Task organization has attained an
understanding of the requirements that the task is to fulfill.
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REVIEW AND REVIEW ITEMS/DATA (cont'd)
REVIEW ITEMS
o Review of the user needs statement
o The results of "get smart" studies
o Verification of the desired capabilities through a solicitation
of inputs from future users
o The results of any trade-offs carried out as a result of new
inputs
o The reconciliation of differences between the Task plans and
the user needs
o Any changes in the technology mix or workforce
o Any changes to the proposal risk assessment, costs, or schedule
Functional Design Review.
Purpose. To ensure that the proposed technical direction of the
task plan is conceptually viable and that any developments required
for successful completion of the task are identified.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Configuration and definition of hardware and software elements
o Design approach
o Trade-offs for important design parameters
o Satisfaction of subsystem requirements by the design
o Areas of concern and problems
o Interfaces with other subsystems (hardware and software) and
cables
o Man-machine interfaces and operations
o Final draft of the Functional Requirements
o Detailed end-to-end system block diagram
o Rationale for system technical approach
o Subsystem budget apportionments (error, weight, power,
reliability, etc.)
o System interfaces and constraints
o Areas of technical uncertainty
o Developments required
o Identification of any differences from proposal baseline
o Design traceability
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Preliminary Design Review. A large number of Preliminary Design
Reviews are conducted during the life of a project or task at
various levels of complexity and formality. The previously
discussed Functional Design Review and Preliminary Mission and
Systems Review are specific examples of top level preliminary
reviews which may be required.
Purpose. The Preliminary Design Review is a review at the system,
subsystem, or assembly level and is intended to assure that the
proposed implementation solutions satisfy the needs and requirements
within existing technologies. This review may assess the timely
availability of technically qualified personnel and proper
facilities.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Final functional requirements
o Compliance with functional requirements/specifications
o Suitability of inherited designs and hardware
o Environmental design requirements
o Interface design requirements
o Design parameters, restraints, and constraints
o Discussion of block diagrams
o Discussion of single-point failures (flight hardware)
o Preliminary parts, materials, and processes list
o Hardware and software development plan and schedule (including
verification tests on analyses to be performed)
o Software standards to be applied
o Experiment performance analysis, including an analysis of the
instrument-system accuracy requirements (flight experiments)
o Preliminary data management flow and reduction plans
o Safety, reliability, and QA compliance plans
o Plans for spares provisioning
o Support equipment requirements and plans
o Preliminary operations planning
o Schedules and status of the task including cost as well as
technical developments
o Presentation of design optimization
o Documentation plans and controls
o Design traceability
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Final Mission and Systems Deaion Review. This review is the top
level Critical Design Review for a major project. See also Section
5.3.6•
Purpose. - TO assure that-all of the final systems designs are
compatible with the project objectives and mission and science
requirements. It also reviews the overall macr©structure for
Project systems integration and test.
REVIEW- ITEMS
o Inheritance assessment
o Specifications (test and performance)
o Prototype test results
o Design mechanization and analysis
o Design trade-offs and alternatives considered
o Detailed interfaces and cable configurations
o Detailed analysis of failures
o Safety analyses and human factors
o Maintainability, repairability, operability, and reliability
o Schedule and resource plans
o Man-machine interfaces
o Training plans
o Conformance of the design to the functional requirements
o Differences between the system and subsystem performances
relative to the performances estimated at the preliminary
design review
o Status of preliminary design review action items
o Detailed design parameters, restraints, and constraints
o Interface details/agreements
o Weight and power
o Detail circuit drawings
o Electronic parts classification
o "Screening specifictions
o Nonelectronic parts, materials, and processing list
o Purchased devices list
o Materials and processing specifications
o Identification and traceability
o Electronic and mechanical parts stress analysis results
o Worst-case analysis
o Conformance to environmental design requirements
o Details of design, construction, and electronics packaging
o QA plans and procedures
o Manufacturing plans
o Configuration control plans (hardware and software)
o Documentation status
o Flow plan and schedule status (hardware and software)
o Problem/failure reporting system
o Failure mode, effects, and analysis
o Preliminary test plans
o Developmental and detailed test results
o Qualification and acceptance test plans
o Calibration plan
o Data management plan
o Formal and informal report plans
o Final design verifications plans
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REVIEW ITEMS
o Initial customer handling or operating constraints and
precautions
o Spares provisioning
o Support equipment requirements
o Flight operations approach
o Schedule and cost status
o Risk assessment
Detailed (Critical) Design Review. A Detailed Design Review is
conducted to match each Project or Task Preliminary Design Review.
Due to high technology content or detailed technology, major
projects often utilize pre-critical design reviews by individuals or
teams. The results of these detailed studies are presented as a
part of the Detailed (Critical) Design Review materials.
Purpose. TO assure that the detailed design meets the requirements,
that an adequate qualification program exists, and that detailed
interfaces are compatible. This review also determines to what
degree the design and reliability meet the provisions of the system
design characteristics, constraints, and other controlling
requirements.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Inheritance assessment
o Specifications (test and performance)
o Prototype test results
o Design mechanization and analysis
o Design trade-offs and alternatives considered
o Detailed interfaces and cable configurations
o Detailed analysis of failures
o Safety analyses and human factors
o Maintainability, repairability, operability, and reliability
o Schedule and resource plans
o Man-machine interfaces
o Training plans
o Conformance of the design to the functional requirements
o Differences between the system and subsystem performances
relative to the performances estimated at the preliminary
design review
o Status of preliminary design review action items
o Detailed design parameters, restraints, and constraints
o Interface details/agreements
o Weight and power
o Detail circuit drawings
o Electronic parts classification
o Screening specifictions
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REVIEW ITEMS
o Nonelectronic parts, materialsf and processing list
o Purchased devices list
o Materials and processing specifications
o Identification and traceability
o Electronic and mechanical parts stress analysis results
o Worst-case analysis
o Ccnformance to environmental design requirements
o Details of design, construction, and electronics packaging
o QA plans and procedures
o Manufacturing plans
o Configuration control plans (hardware and software)
o Documentation status
o Flow plan and schedule status (hardware and software)
o Problem/failure reporting system
o Failure mode, effects, and analysis
o Preliminary test plans
o Developmental and detailed test results
o Qualification and acceptance test plans
o Calibration plan
o Data management plan
o Formal and informal report plans
o Final design verifications plans
o Initial customer handling or operating constraints and
precautions
o Spares provisioning
o Support equipment requirements
o Flight operations approach
o Schedule and cost status
o Risk assessment
Manufacturing Review. A detailed review of the procedures and
facilities which will be used in the fabrication of flight hardware.
Purpose. TO assure that the facilities and procedures used in the
fabrication of flight hardware are adequate. Items of specific
importance are the manufacturing orders and configuration control
methods to be used.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Manufacturing orders
o Configuration control plans
o Manufacturing process
o Personnel certification
o Mandatory inspection points
o Rework procedures
o Review of manufacturing facilities
o Hardware protection procedures
o Production control plans
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80% Cornplete/90-Day Review.
Purpose. To assure that the task commitments will be met and to
present the plans for meeting those commitments within the time and
resources remaining.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Status of effort remaining
o Final report status and outline
o Schedule of remaining activities
o Workforce and resource plan for remaining effort
o Reconciliation of remaining effort with remaining resources
o Risk assessment
o Plan for follow-on work
Subsystem Transfer Review.
Purpose. To assure that the subsystem implementation has been
completed, requirements have been met, required testing has been
performed and passed, required documentation and spares are
delivered, training support has been provided, and any discrepancies
have been resolved.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Report on acceptance test performance
o Spares status
o Documentation status
o Anomalies and liens
o Training status
o Software status
Test: Pl Review
Purpose. To assess adequacy of planning for system level test and
integration, and compatibility with project level design
verification.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Verification of all functional requirements
o Environmental requirements
o Draft test plans
o Test equipment design
o Test complex block diagrams
o Test layout and circuitry
o Test objectives
o Open action items requiring test to close
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Svstem Test Review
Purpose- To review results from each system level test and to
assure that any open action items relative to functional or
environmental qualification are resolved.
The review concentrates upon complete system test results
records. It is also appropriate to review open action items and
prior problem/failure history against test results. All functional
requirements must be verified.
Project Capabilities Review
Purpose. To evaluate final prelaunch mission design and missiSii
capabilities against Project requirements; to compare "as-built"
capabilities of all systems with established requirements; to
prepare for intersystem testing; and to close out all open action
items.
REVIEW ITEMS
o All System Test Review results
o Mission design verification test plans
o Intersystem testing plans
o Problem/failure report history
o Status of all currently approved drawing and specifications,
including specification changes and waivers
o Hardware status and documentation, including configuration
management records
Preshioment Review
Purpose. To verify that testing is complete with no unresolved
problems, and to evaluate readiness of the hardware for delivery.
For a flight project, to verify the readiness of ground-based
facilities at the launch site and of the integrated flight team
training.
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REVIEW ITEMS
o Verification of availability of current approved drawings and
specifications, and of adequate definition of the item,
including approved specification changes and waivers
o Review of hardware status and documentation, including all
interface documentation, to assure that the latest changes have
been incorporated in affected hardware, as reflected in a
summary of the Engineering Change Requests
o Review of test documentation status and determination (by
review of the test results) of the adequate and proper testing
of hardware
o Status of prior formal review action item closures
o Review of the Problem/Failure Report documentation to determine
its status and evaluate its total impact, particularly with
respect to risk for the experiment
o Review of the quality history to ensure that necessary
inspections have been performed and all discrepancies have been
properly disposed of, including Material Review Board actions
o Review of the results of each instrument calibration report to
ensure compliance with the Functional Requirements and the
calibration plan, including measured instrument weight and
power
o Shipping and handling requirements and plans
o Safety compliance verification
o Status and acceptability of the deliverable end item data
package
o Risk assessment
Project Readiness Review. This review is required only for flight
projects, and is normally chaired by the Project Manager.
Purpose. TO assess results of the ground data test program; verify
that the flight crew is trained and that ground system deficiencies
that might affect launch and encounter have been corrected; assure
that operational procedures have been verified; and assess readiness
of the flight systems after integration with the injection vehicle.
This review examines any problems encountered after the
flight systems have been delivered to the launch site, and assures
that all integration and final testing have been satisfactorily
completed.
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Launch Readiness Review. Like the Project Readiness Review, this
review is unique to flight projects. It is normally chaired by the
Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects.
Purpose. To verify that no unresolved problems exist with the
flight systems, launch vehicle, launch complex, and operational
configuration for launch; and to commit to launch.
REVIEW ITEMS
Same as for the Project Readiness Review, including the
findings of that review.
Postlaunch Software Reauirements Review
Purpose. To review adequacy of software requirements and planning
for encounter operations.
REVIEW ITEMS
o All software documentation
o Current operational experiences
b Planned encounter scenarios
Orbit Operations Readiness Review. This review is required only for
a flight project which involves operations in orbit about a body in
space. A similar review would be required for a flight project
which involved landed operations.
Purpose. To verify operational readiness for encounter.
REVIEW ITEMS
Includes as a minimum all plans for orbit insertion and
science sequences in the vicinity of the objective.
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Encounter fiflEflhj "M-tiea Rgvigw. This review is required only for a
flight project when final refinement of operational planning
requires information only available after the spaoe systems are in
orbit, e.g., precise determination of trajectories for planetary
satellite encounters or orbits.
Purpose. TO review any changes in mission operations planning to
assure that the mission as implemented will meet project
requirements; to assess the status of any capabilities being added.
REVIEW ITEMS
• All operational planning and science sequence changes.
Final Report Review. This discussion addresses primarily the review
of a task rather than a project.
Purpose. To review the results of the project or task, in
particular the final reports, to ascertain that the report is
credible and of a sufficient quality to satisfactorily represent
JPI/Caltech.
REVIEW ITEMS
o Comments on the final report draft
o Customer viewpoint on task
o Potential for follow-on work
o Schedules and resources for retaining effort
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Formal Reviews. During the review, requests for action are
submitted by review board members and attendees if invited to
participate on forms that are provided by the secretary. Following,
the review these are screened by the review board to consolidate
them and to ensure that the chairman and cognizant manager
understand the intent of the requests. The requests for action
support the findings of the board and are normally included as an
attachment to the board report.
Informal Review Minimum Level. An attendee may be designated to
compile the requests/ which may be provided either verbally or in
writing.
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CLOSEOUT
Formal Reviews. The responsibility for accepting, rejecting, or
acting in part on the board's recommendations rests with the
cognizant manager. A written response to the board provides
documentation of the disposition of the recommendations and provides
assurance that the board's recommendations are properly interpreted
and considered. The cognizant manager reviews proposed action items
with those to whom the action is assigned. They should establish an
action plan (i.e., how the action item will be resolved, by whom,
when). The cognizant manager should report on the status of the
action items to the convening authority, with copies to the board
secretary and the Office of Engineering and Review.
Formal Reviews. Action items are closed by memorandum, and copies
are sent to the chairman for approval and distribution. The
memoranda are to include the supporting information for the
recommended closure action. The secretary of the board maintains a
file of all board actions, including closure memoranda, as a central
point for all board members.
Formal Reviews. Following appropriate board deliberation and
consensus where possible, the findings of the board and any
recommendations are prepared by the secretary, approved by the
board, and sent to the convening authority and the cognizant manager
for their study and disposition. Dissenting opinions may also be
attached. The cognizant manager determines disposition of the
findings and recommendations; eg., identifies action items,
formulates an ad hoc study team, makes policy decisions, or takes
whatever action he believes is appropriate for each specific
finding, concern, or recommendation.
Informal Review Minimum Level. The cognizant manager advises
the convening authority by issuing a list of action items, action
item assignees, and due dates.
Informal Review Minimum Level. At preestablished intervals the
cognizant manager should update the listing of action item closures
and obtain new closure dates on past-due items. This information is
distributed periodically until all action items are closed.
Reyj.ew Mini] mum L^*ve,V A brief memo documenting findings is
desirable.
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LAUNCH VEHICLE COMPONENT AND SYSTEM
DESIGN REVIEW
Purpose
This section establishes general guidelines and requirements for con-
ducting launch vehicle component and system desJgn reviews which are un-
der the purview of NASAcenteras applicable to the Atlas/Centaur launch
vehicle and its related ground support equipment. It is not intended
that these reviews be held for every vehicle, but rather for new systems
designs, first of a kind components and/or changes in design philosophy.
Scope .
The scope of the design reviews may range from piece parts, subassem-
blles, unit level, systems or combined systems, on vehicle airborne or
ground support hardware, and be mechanical or electrical in nature or com-
binations of both. Since the scope is wide, a list of common guidelines
fs Indicated for design, reviews in general. A second list indicates those
criteria which may apply to a particular hardware design and should be re-
ferred to as a checklist for possible areas to be covered.
PROCEDURES
Procedures are not described in this document.
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PERSONNEL
NASA/center Chai rman
LV Division Chief - Optional
LVD Branch Chief/Section Head as appropriate - Optional
Responsible System Engineer
System Engineering Staff Engineer
Mission Project Engineer - Optional
Reliabil ity and Quality Assurance Engineers - Optional
Contractors/Vendors
KSC/EV - Optional
Spacecraft Agency - Optional
RESPONSIBILITIES
The responsibilities of review board personnel are not
described in this document.
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1. Special environmental criteria; e.g., temperature, thermal
cycling, humidity, radiation, pressure, acoustic, shock or steady state
loads, EMI, acceleration.
2. Size/weight considerations.
3« Mounting requirements.
4. Power, grounding or shielding requirements, connector locations,
PIN assignment, etc.
5. Items for special consideration or nrogram control; e.g., con-
tamination, age/cycle/use limits, warning/caution marking, radiation,
vibration limits, vibration effects and electrical and mechanical isolation.
6. Packaging requirements.
7. Hardware maintainability; ease of cleaning, adjusting and replace-
ment .
8. Human engineering aspects.
9. Special tools, test equipment and facilities required for fabrica-
tion, test or operations.
10. New processes, materials or techniques required.
11. Part and material selection of vendor items to optimize r e l i a b i l i t y ,
standardization, availability, inspection, test, handling, preservation and
application.
12. Testing at piece part, subassembly, unit and system levels.
13- Special analysis required; e.g., circuits, thermal, stress, elec-
trical stress/derating, clearance, worst case, tolerance, test logic, error,
single point failure, hazard, etc.
1A. -Effect on other systems or interfaces.
15. Effect on software.
16. Identification methods.
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1. Review and approve the design requirements and criteria speci-
fied for the hardware under review.
2._ Review and approve primary conceptual design and alternate
designs considered.
3. Review and approve general layout or block diagram level
description of primary design.
4. Review detail drawings/schematics where appropriate to explain
design features.
5. .Review expected performance parameters, if appropriate.
6. Review the design for failure modes and their effects on reli-
ability, inspection, test and operation. The techniques of Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FHEA) are used iteratively during design and develop-
ment .
7- Review design checklist to assure that all aspects of design
have been covered as applicable.
8. Review the design for its effects on personnel and launch vehicle
safety.
9. Review and approve the test program outlined for carrying the
design through development, qualification and finally hardware acceptance
testing.
10. Review the design to see that it permits and facilitates pro-
ducibility, repeatability and inspectabi1ity and that related quality con-
siderations are obtained.
11. Review the schedule for design release through hardware avai I -
a b i l i t y .
12. Review cost, contractual status and/or vendor selection.
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No feedback process is described in this document.
CLOSEOUT
The contractor provides the necessary materials to present the design in-
cluding drawings, schematics, photographs, Vu-graphs/slides and data. The
contractor w i l l also prepare the minutes and publish any action items
resulting from the review with signature concurrence on the action items.
Due dates for satisfying the action items shall be established and
closed as soon as possible. The status and completion of action items w i l l
be monitored by the responsible system engineer.
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CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW (CODR)
PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW (PDR)
CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW (CDR)
PREFLMGHT REVIEW PRESHIPMENT READINESS REVIEW
POST FLIGHT REVIEW
PROCEDURES
This instruction sets forth the criteria, policy,
and procedures for review of aeronautic and space
flight projects and experiments under the management
of this Center and flight experiments included as a
part of a mission managed external to this Center.
The criteria stated herein are minimum requirements
that will permit total visibility by a third-party
review committee of the technical and management
aspects of . •- ; -, flight
projects and experiments. The requirements of this
Instruction do not supersede other reviews impose**
by NASA Headquarters, other Centers, or other
reviews.
This Center will conduct the following sequential
set of reviews for flight projects and experiments:
- Design Reviews
Conceptual Design Review (CoDR)
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
. Critical Design Review (CDR)
- Preshipment Readiness Review
- Preflight Review
- Postflight Review
This policy may be altered by the cognizant Program
Director to meet unique requirements.
The above reviews are advisory in nature and do not
relieve personnel of the responsibility for the
success of the project or mission.
The Chairperson of each review, or the cognizant
Program Director, may also establish other special
reviews to supplement the above reviews.
All .. Program Directors are to support the above
reviews. They are to furnish senior personnel,
experienced in the required technical disciplines,
as requested.
The Chairperson of each review shall organize the
Committee and draw support from other Centers or
Federal Agencies as required.
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PROCEDURES (Contd.)
Deviations from the review policies established in
this instruction may be made only with the approval
of the cognizant Program Director.
The primary objective of the above reviews is to
enhance the probability of success of flight
missions. This will be achieved by utilizing the
cumulative knowledge and skills of the team of engi-
neers and scientists who have been selected for
their experience with particular systems and
functions.
The reviews will be technically oriented, however,
proper consideration is to be given to operating
constraints — particularly those involving primary
mission objectives and program costs and schedules.
The Project Manager, or equivalent, is to insure
that personnel from the appropriate NASA
Headquarters Program Office are informed of review
date and, to the extent practicable, arrange for
reviews to be scheduled to allow NASA Headquarters'
participation.
There are three levels of design reviews which are
to be phased into the project/mission schedule at
appropriate times. New designs are to include all
three reviews; namely:
. Conceptual Design Review (CoDR) — In some
cases this review may be eliminated if the
concept has been demonstrated and only minor
changes are necessary.
. Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
. Critical Design Review (CDR)
The CoDR will normally be scheduled at a time which
will permit assessment as noted above and prior to
the start of development testing.
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CDR, PDR, CODR, POST FLIGHT REVIEW
PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Chairperson:
Secretary:
Members:
Assistant Director for Systems
Engineering and Operations or
designated representative
Appointed by the Chairperson
Representative, Systems Safety,
Quality and Reliability Office
At least five representatives from
supporting line organizations as
deemed appropriate by the
Chairperson.
The Project Manager, or equivalent, is respon-
sible for notifying the Chairperson of a review
within sufficient time so as to permit an orderly
preparation of the review.
Chairperson:
Secretary:
Members:
PRESHIPMENT READINESS REVIEW
Chairperson, CDR Committee
Appointed by the Chairperson
Head, Systems Safety, Quality and
Reliability Office
At least five representatives from
supporting line organizations as
deemed appropriate by the
Chairperson
Chairperson:
Secretary:
Members:
PREFLIGHT REVIEW
Cognizant Program Director
Appointed by the Chairperson
Chairperson, Preshipment Readiness
Review
Chief, Flight Electronics Division
Chief, Systems Engineering Division
Public Affairs Officer
Head, Systems Safety, Quality and
Reliability Office
Representatives from other organi-
zations as deemed appropriate by
the Chairperson.
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PREFLIGHT REVIEW (Contd.)
The Chairperson is responsible for documenting the
major findings of the Preflight Review resolution of
all open Items, and reporting flight readiness of
the project/mission to the Director center.
POST FLIGHT REVIEW
The Project Manager, or equivalent, is to arrange
for such a review through the cognizant Program
Director.
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REVIEW ITEMS/DATA .
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REVIEW
The objective of the CoDR is to present the scien-
tific requirements and examine the proposed design
approach to accomplish these requirements by
examining, completing, and presenting the:
- initial design
trade-off studies
- alternate configurations
- selection of critical parts
- preliminary analyses
- definition of environments
- interface requirements
- Government Supplied Equipment (GSE)
- project planning
- software approach, etc.
so that the design can be examined at the conceptual
level with confidence.
, PRELIMINARY DESIOI 'REVIEW
The objective of the PDR is to examine in detail the
baseline project/mission design being planned for
manufacture and qualifications, validate the design
approaches as related to project/mission require-
ments, and cover such items as:
- mechanical design layouts
- circuit designs
- design analyses
- performance analyses
- results of development testing
- GSE requirements
- manufacturing and qualification test planning
- status of reliability, quality assurance, and
systems safety programs
- status of planning for data retrieval, analysis,
and publication
The PDR will normally be scheduled at the completion
of the preliminary design and prior to she fabrica-
tion of qualification hardware.
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REVIEW ITEMS/DATA (contd.)
: CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW
The objective of the CDR is to examine details of
the final design and mission, verify the final
plans, design, fabrication plans, and flight accepc-
tance test planning as related to project/mission
requirements, and cover such items as:
- updated final design and analyses
- qualification test and calibration test results
- functional and performance test results
- reliability, quality assurance, and safety
programs
- a review of the plans for data retrieval,
analysis, and publication
The CDR will normally be scheduled at the completion
of the qualification test program.
PRESHIPMENT READINESS REVIEW
The objective of the Preshipment Readiness Review is
to inspect flight hardware, make final review of
project/mission plans, concentrate on results of
acceptance testing, and cover such items as:
- validating the quality of the hardware
- confirming that the hardware is flightworthy and
will perform properly under the simulated flight
environment
- assessing that the mission objectives will be met
- compliance with mission requirements and
specifications
- refurbishment and recalibration plans (when
required)
- shipping and storage plans
- confirmation of compatibility with all interface,
weather protection, and contamination control
plans
- all failures or anomalies during test
- status of safety and reliability analyses and
verification of compliance with documentation
requirements
The Preshipment Readiness Review will normally be
held after the completion of major acceptance
testing and prior to shipment of flight hardware*
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PREFLIGHT REVIEW
The objective of the Preflight Review is to assess
the overall readiness of the project to perform its
project/mission and is to cover such items as:
- flight readiness of all hardware, software, and
operational elements
- completed ground support operations
- interfaces with other flight equipment
- ground based mission support requirements
- flight operations plans
- data retrieval and processing, including ground
network compatibility tests
- public information plans
The Preflight Review will normally be held as near
as practicable to the flight date.
POST FLIGHT REVIEW
A Postfllght Review for Center Management is to be
held as soon as a general assessment of the
project/mission can be made.
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Minutes
Minutes of each review are to be distributed to
committee members and appropriate Division Chiefs
and Program Directors.
Minutes are to be made a part of project/mission
files.
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CLOSEOUT
The Project Manager, or equivalent, is responsi-
ble for insuring that appropriate action items,
comments, and recommendations resulting from a
review, also any open action items, are
appropriately discussed at the next review.
At the conclusion of the CDR, the review committee
should have confidence that they have reviewed the
final design and planning, that sufficient data has
been presented to demonstrate the design is com-
patible with the total flight system, and the
project/mission will be accomplished within cost and
schedule constraints.
D-40
CENTER NO.4
DOCUMENT NO. 4-1
D-41
CENTER NO.4
DOCUMENT NO. 4-1
BASELINE DESIGN REVIEW
PURPOSE
To provide policy, guidelines, and responsibilities for a consistent approach
to the conduct of baseline design reviews research and development
hardware and software.
SCOPE
This Instruction is applicable to all involved in the plan-
ning, research, design, development, testing, and management of space hard-
ware and software, subject to the limitations as noted in the Instruction.
PROCEDURES
It is the policy that a consistent approach be used in the preparation
and conduct of baseline design reviews for all programs, projects, payloads,
and experiments managed by the Center. In consonance with this policy, it is
recognized that the diversified programs and projects assigned re-
quire considerable variation in the management and operational modes used by
the program/project managers. Therefore, although a consistent approach to
baseline design review is essential, the scope of the individual reviews may
vary. For example, in the development of experiments, a limited scope of
review-may be proposed and conducted, subject to agreement and concurrence of
the program/project manager and the Director, Science and Engineering. For
full scale reviews the complete Board Structure and documentation as speci-
fied by this Instruction will be required, consistent with the scope of the
review, and subject to the agreement and concurrence of the program/project
manager and the Director, Science and Engineering.
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BASELINE DESIGN REVIEW
PERSONNEL
BOARD
PROGRAM/PROJECT MANAGER
PROGRAM/PROJECT OFFICES LEVEL
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR LEVEL
CHIEF ENGINEER
LAB DIRECTORS LEVEL
SAFETY OFFICE AND OTHERS AS APPLICABLE
OTHER NASA
OTHER GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR (NON-VOTING)
PREBOARD
TEAM
PROGRAM/PROJECT OFFICES LEVEL
CHIEF ENGINEER
LAB DIRECTORS LEVEL
OTHER LAB PERSONNEL
SAFETY OFFICE AND OTHERS AS APPLICABLE
OTHER NASA
OTHER GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR (NON-VOTING)
PROGRAM/PROJECT OFFICES LEVEL
CHIEF ENGINEER
OTHER LAB PERSONNEL
SAFETY OFFICE AND OTHERS . AS APPLICABLE
OTHER NASA
OTHER GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR (NON-VOTING)
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BASELINE DESIGN REVIEW
PERSONNEL (cont'd)
SUB-TEAM
PROGRAM/PROJECT OFFICES LEVEL
OTHER LAB PERSONNEL
SAFETY OFFICE AND OTHERS AS APPLICABLE
OTHER NASA
OTHER GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR (NON-VOTING)
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RESPONSIBILITIES
* Program/Project Offices are responsible for the initiation and overall
conduct of design reviews and for providing a summary of each review and
the results to management. This responsibility includes
preparation of a Configuration Management Plan for
each discrete program/project. The Configuration Management Plan will
establish minimum requirements for each review., the required data and
the completion percentages of the data will be included
in the Configuration Management Plan following approval. Pro-
gram/project managers will obtain the required concurrence from the As-
sociate Director for Engineering, S&E. Resolution of any nonconcurrence
will involve joint review and agreement by senior S&E and Program Office
management.
• Science and Engineering is responsible for the technical aspects of
design reviews, for providing technical support and expertise at all
levels of the review, and for presenting assessments to the Program/
Project Offices.
« Review Boards will review previous actions by teams and Preboards and
rule on (approve/disapprove) RID action recommendations submitted by the
Preboard, assuring that the design requirements levied on the program/
project are met and verified, and recommend approval of the baseline
documents.
• Preboards will review previous actions by teams; evaluate RID's from
various technical teams; integrate or consolidate similar RID's; recom-
mend acceptance of RID's as written or modified; recommend RID's for
study; recommend RID's to the Board for resolution; and provide a summary
of actions to the Board.
* Teams -will evaluate RID's; integrate similar RID's from subteams; gen-
erate RID's; recommend disposition of RID's to Preboard; and provide a
summary of actions to the Preboard.
9 Subteams will review and evaluate data made available for review; and
generate RID's. In cases where subteams are not required, these respon-
sibilities will be carried out at the team level.
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REVIEW ITEMS/DATA
SCIENCE REQUIREMENTS LISTING
DRAWINGS, SKETCHES AND SCHEMATICS
ANALYSES
STUDY REPORTS
DESIGN CONCEPT DOCUMENTS
PRELIMINARY INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS
PRELIMINARY WBS
GENERAL TEST PLANS
PRELIMINARY R&QA PLANS
PHASE B STUDY RESULTS
DEVELOPMENT PLANS
FLOW DIAGRAMS
SAFETY ANALYSIS
SAFETY ANALYSIS
FMEA AND CRITICAL ITEM LIST
TEST VERIFICATION/VALIDATION PLANS
INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
PART 1 CEI SPECIFICATION (DRAFT)
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION. DOCUMENT
WBS
SOFTWARE PROGRAM DESIGN DOCUMENT
SPARES PHILOSOPHY
I COs
TEST RESULTS (PRELIMINARY)
CODE TO DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
USERS MANUALS
ACCEPTANCE TEST
SPARES LIST
INTEGRATION PLANS
SUBSYSTEMS DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT
ALL TECHNICAL DATA, DRAWINGS, AND SPECIFICATIONS
DELIVERABLE DATA PER CONTRACT
DATA AS DEFINED IN PACKAGE OF DES REVIEW ANNOUNCEMENT
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REVIEW ITEMS/DATA (cont'd)
VERIFY CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS AND REQUIREMENTS
VERIFY MISSION OBJECTIVES
QUALIFY APPROACH
ESTABLISH AND APPROVE PROGRAM/PROJECT REQUIREMENTS BASELINE
BASIC DESIGN APPROACH
COMPATIBLE DESIGN/REQUIREMENTS
TEST PLANNING
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
ESTABLISH AND APPROVE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS BASELINE
CONFIGURATION DESIGN
SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY
DESIGN INTEGRITY
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
ESTABLISH SCHEDULE
ESTABLISH AND APPROVE "DRAWING BASELINE"
CONFIGURATION WAIVERS AND DEVIATIONS
VALIDATE QUALIFICATION TESTS
ASSESS SYSTEM TESTS
ACCEPT GSE CONFIGURATION
ESTABLISH AND APPROVE PRODUCT CONFIGURATION BASELINE
REVIEW CRITICAL HARDWARE
REVIEW PARTICAL
ASSESS DEFICIENCIES
CERTIFY DESIGN
CERTIFY READINESS
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FEEDBACK AND CLOSEOUT
Review Boards will review previous actions by teams and Prebbards and
rule on (approve/disapprove) RID action recommendations- submitted by the
Preboard, assuring that the design requirements levied on the program/
project are met and verified, and recommend approval of the baseline
documents.
Preboards will review previous actions by teams; evaluate RID's from
various technical teams; integrate or consolidate similar RID's; recom-
mend acceptance of RID's as written or modified; recommend RID's for
study; recommend RID's to the Board for resolution; and provide a summary
of actions to the Board.
Teams-will evaluate RID's; integrate similar RID's from subteams; gen-
erate RID's; recommend disposition of RID's to Preboard; and provide a
summary of actions to the Preboard.
Subteams will review and evaluate data made available for review; and
generate RID's. In cases where subteams are not required, these respon-
sibilities will be carried out at the team level.
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DOCUMENT NO. 5-1
DESIGN^ENGINEERING SHUTTLE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM READINESS REVIEW CYCLE
PURPOSE
This directive establishes requirements, organizational responsibilities
and procedures to be used within OE for the preparation of the Launch
Readiness Review cycle presentations.
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PROCEDURES
Readiness Reviews (LRR)
The following reviews are required:
(a) ET/SRB Mate Review
(b) Pre-Stack Review
(c) VAB Rollout Review
(d) Launch Readiness Review
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PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Project Management Directorate. DF
(1) Prepares LRR/Pre-LRR presentations.
(2) Disseminates schedules and program requirements within OE
for Readiness Reviews.
(3) Provides representations at all Readiness Reviews.
(4) Establishment of badglng requirements and distribution.
Mechanical and Facilities Engineering Directorate (DP) and the
Electronic Directorate (PL). Provides design support to DF as
required 1n the development of Readiness Reviews.
Management Operations Office. DE-MOO
(1) Develop policy for Readiness Reviews.
(2) Coordinate with other elements to ensure that DE
policies-and procedures are compatible wltn „ policy.
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REVIEW ITEMS/DATA
The Readiness Review Cycle typical coverage will Include:
» • '-.:'-, major configuration changes subsequent to
previous launch.
• - previous anomalies, damage or problems as
related to the activity under review.
Present the status of priority spare parts.
• the Systems Assurance Analyses (SAA's). List
the numbers of category 1, IS and 2 single failure
points (SFP's) and residual hazards and discuss those
for which the risks have not been accepted.
• a status of the Operation and maintenance
Requirements and Specifications Documentation (OMRSD)
and acceptance of waivers received from O&M.
o a summary assessment of the readiness of the
design of the hardware and software to support
achievement of the objectives of the milestone event.
• • a listing of all approved changes not yet
Installed, that are required to support the milestone
event.
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FEEDBACK
• Review major configuration changes subsequent to
previous launch.
» Review previous anomalies, damage or problems as
related to the activity under review.
• Present the status of priority spare parts.
9
 Review the Systems Assurance Analyses (SAA's). List
the numbers of category 1, IS and 2 single failure
points (SFP's) and residual hazards and discuss those
for which the risks have not been accepted.
• Present a status of the Operation and Maintenance
Requirements and Specifications Documentation (OMRSD)
and acceptance of waivers received from O&M.
• Present a summary assessment of the readiness of the
design of the hardware and software to support
achievement of the objectives of the milestone event.
• Provide a listing of all approved changes not yet
Installed* that are required to support the milestone
event.
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SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
PURPOSE
This Directive establishes the role of the Center in support of the
Orbital Flight Test (OFT) Program flight readiness review (FRR) cycle.
APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This Directive applies to all organizational elements and serves as the
authority document for preparation and conduct of the Flight Readiness
Review (FRR). It also defines the Center's responsibilities in support
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Office of
Space Transportation Systems (OSTS) OFT FRR. However, this Directive
recognizes that the Payload Mission Managers are responsible for the
individual mission payloads and they will execute "Certification of
Flight Readiness" documents and FRR functions which are outside the
scope of this Directive.
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PROCEDURES
The. FRR. cycle provides a means of" <issessing the readiness of flight
hjrjw^re and supporting (hardwdre/^of tware) systems to '..uccessful iy
j<:coi.ij;l ish assigned functions during launch-, flight, and iundiruj
operations of the space vehicle, c^rgo, and flight, crews for eacf
urbital Flight Test (OFT) flight.
An FRR will be scheduled approximately two weeks prior to oach OFT
flight. All activities/elements necessary tor safe and successful
conduct of the forthcoming flight will be reviewed <it each FRR as
follows:
. Pre-FRR Level II Reviews. Prior to each FRk, appropriate Level II
reviews covering all elements associated with rhe upccr.ing flight
will be scheduled and conducted at locations designated by Lt.<el
I!. Results of the Level II reviews w i l l be documented and pro-
vided to the FRR board members no later than one day ;.»rior 10 tno
FM. This documentation should include ininutos of the proce^J-
:ngs, review item dispositions (R'IDs), and signed statements of
flight readiness for applicable categories.
Conduct. FRRs will be chaired by the Assoc^te Adinini'.>tri-
tor/Space Transportation System (AA/STSJ, and board i;ri.;bers ^ i l l -
be designated by him. Routine status, background and/or SL,bsys-
lens descriptions will be limited to those necessary for idequdte
coverage of the issues on the agenda. The agenda w i l l be develou-
»ia oy Level II, in coordination with the Program Director, cc
emphasize significant issues and open it.oms idpntifiec at or sub-
sequent to Level II reviews.
rost-FRR. All action items ana open work identified a: tne t-"*^
'.ost be formally closed prior to flight with the signature of the
Program Manager and Program Director or their designated represen-
tatives. The closeout documentation is to include a urief summary
narrative description of the actions ta^r on each Fkk action item
and the documentation necrtssary to support the summary narrative
:e.g., vugraph material). In addition, open it.ws thut arise sub-
sequent to the FRR that could delay the flight, change: test vehi-
cle configuration, or cause basic changes to the operations plan-
ning are to be reported to the Program Director.
IVior to each launch, the level II Program Hjnayer w i l l review am
,-resent closeout rationale for all open it<-:ir. at jn ;. -2 day Meet-
ing with the Program Uireet.ur and the
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PROCEDURES (contKd)
Ttie norr.idl preparation _ in support of a FRR shall begin L/y a
flight readiness reviev/ ( FRR) which w i l l oe scheduled 'j days prior
to, itnd in preparation for, the Pre-FRR. The K FRR shall be chaired
oy :ne Manager, Shuttle Projects Office and pre>ente<i tu tiie Center
slir-jctor. The reviev/ will describe und document the readiness staiu
of :tie vehicle, GSE, vehicle canjo, su;>port.iny sy^teias and facili-
ties, and launch, landing, and recovery teams to successfully dcccm-
plish launch of the STS vehicle in support of oFTs.
A Si'ecial FRR for STS-0 will be required due i<: the uniqueness of
tne FRF as part of the CDDT for i'rwr and snail ne condocced by thi
r'anriyer, Shuttle Projects Office. This review w i l - describe a.id docj-
:.cnt the state of STS-U readiness for successfully ai.uompl ishios the
CDDT/FRF. A S',JSequent Delta Fi<R v;ill be accon^l ished for STS-i. und
it w i l l be controlled within th« mdr.dyeuent structure
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The Manager, Shuttle Projects Office is responsible-forr - " - - - .
u_ Serving as the intercenter interface with NASA Headquarters,
and other centers for support of the FRK. > .
. Receiving, interpreting, and disseminating FRk requirements,
guidelines, agenda, and schedule.
.• Providing a representative to serve as a member of the FRR Secre-
tariat to arrange for:
- Meeting facilities. . __ " . • -
- Access controls. .,-.-.'
 : • • - - . . • . . . ' - • - . -
FRR Secretariat support,Ho
 : include;office space, furniture,"
supplies, clerical assistance, reproduction facilities, and
telephones.. " • V •: .• :;J;T:V/ '•- s::.;;- •- •; . :. ; '.-' :-_.„ r-t;.::j
Reporting to Level I & II with the assistance of the Directors-bf^
Shuttle Operations, Design Engineering, Technical Support, Cargo
Operations, Administration and Management Operations, Safety, R&QA
and Protective Services, the Manager,; Cargo Projects Office, and ;.
the Biomedical Office on the readiness of the space vehicle, GSE,
Shuttle to Cargo Integration,, launch and landing facilities,
support, services, and .ETR: support; services as follows:
- -Presenting data on:
s Open work. '."'£•
: llM ™~"~
1 Status of vehicle .UK: l.iurvch support f a c i l i t i e s , sys-
terns, equipment, nimn.* support, launch commit criteria,
and other routine operational support (e.»j., personnel
training, documentation, etc..). .. .. .. .
t Category 1, IS, and 2 SKI's residual nozar-ds end (.ir-L'bVm
reports.
\ Deviation/Waivers.
I Operation and Maintenance Instructions (OMIs) status.
: Other data deemed ;>ertinent to, or requested by, OSTS to
be presented to Levels I and II.
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^Certifying the readiness of the space vehicle, faci-
lities, systems, equipment, support, launch and landing sup-
port, and team services to support launch and landing for
each flight . '-- . _ . . " '
Chairing the . FRR.
• Developing guidelines and coordinating requirements with the
Directors of participating primary organizations.
* Identifying items which require resolution prior to launch,
and assigning these items to the cognizant Director.
» Providing the following facilities, arrangements, or
services:
- Date of the FRR and agenda.
- Meeting facilities, including audio-visual equipment.
— Access control and seat allocations.
— Secretariat to riecord FRR action items.
The Director of Design Engineering is responsible for:
. Presenting an assessment of 1, 1R, IS & 2 criticality categories
as defined by the Facilities, Systems and Equipment Organizational
Level OMD Baseline and essential to the support of launch and
landing operations.
. Presenting, in sui.muiry fonidt, j listiiuj of all Category [, IK,
IS, and 2 single failure points (SFPs) and residual design hazards
{KDHS) that have been identified. The list should indicate those
items for which the Center Director has accepted risks and dates
of acceptances. (This includes system, line replaceable units
(LRUs), and components.)
Discussing the status of software under his co'j-s/arce and associ-
ated residual hazards.
Summarizing significant changes in configuration of "launch support
facilities and systems baseline.
Discussing open mandatory nodifications, identifying those fur
v/hich modification packages are to De released, and providing iui-
^act of Codifications upon the launch operations vehicle and sys-
t ems.
Identifying and discussing uny significant problems uhich could
•npact the launch schedule.
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The Directors of Shuttle Operations and Technical Support are responsible,
for presenting their respective assessments of facilities, systems, and
equipment including associated hardware (within their OStM responsibility)
as defined by the Facilities, Systems and Equipment Organizational Level
OMD Baseline and essential to launch and landing operations. The Director
of Shuttle Operations is also responsible for presenting an assessment of
_the flight hardware/software relative to the launch and landing operations
function. The presentations shall include:
Open work and' special tests to be completed (e.y^.OMIs, Category
n paper, Operations <4 Maintenance Requirements/Specifications
(OKRS) not i.iet, Engineering Support Requests- (ESRs), and concerns
related to their successful completion).
. Open or potential problems documented by problem report(s), devia-
tion/waiver(s) or equivalent report(s). The discussion should
identify operational concern, corrective action in work or
planned, and impact on the launch schedule.
Status of the launch commit criteria a.ia d discussion of any
changes (deltas) to the previous mission baseline.
Identification and status of any essential facility, system, or
equipment not operational due to shortage of spare parts, includ-
ing discussion of any work-orounds.
A discussion of significant changes in tin.- CDDT and launch count-
down UMIs.
. Status of other operations and support functions, to include, but
not be limited to, the following:
- Range support.
- Personnel training.
- Replacement of limited life components.
— Material- shortages.
- Documentation.
Status of operational software.
. A sun.iary of all residual operational h.izards including those*
associated with the operational software.
D-. rector uf Shuttle Operations w i l l sign the Certification cf
p l i g h t Readiness, Endorsement ;.-'2. - '- - ' -'•
Trie Director of Administration and Management Operations is responsi-
ple for presenting an assessment of the availability of spare parts
for support of essential facilities, system-,, and equipment reported
nonoperational.
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Trie Director, Safety, R&QA, <ind i'ruiective Serv ices is responsible
fur:
i. Reporting on the status of security, fife and rescue plans, train-
ing, equipment, and personnel.
. Summarizing the design and operational hazardous situations anu
providing the status of open hazards in tne Integrated Hazard
Analysis.
The Director, Biomedical Office is responsible for presenting c-n
assessment of medical equipment, facilities, .jnc personnel witnin 'Jie
Biomedical Office's area of responsibility.
The Manager, Cargo Projects Office and the Director of Cargo Operations
jire responsible for presenting their respective assessments of
facilities, systems, and equipment including associated hardware
(within their O&M responsibility) as defined by the Facilities,
"Systems, and Equipment Organizational Level OMD Baseline and
essential to the cargo processing facility, GSE, and software.
The Manager, Cargo Projects Office, and the Director of Cargo
Operations are also responsible for presenting an assessment of
responsibilities. The presentations shall include:
Open work and special tests to be completed (e.y., OMis, Category
II paper, Operations 4 Maintenance Requirements/Specifications
(UMRS) not met, Engineering Support Requests (ESRs), one concerns
related to their successful completion).
Open or potential problems documented by problem repcr*. (s), d*-••/:<}-
tion/waiver(s) or equivalent report(s). The discussicr shou;.j
'identify operational concern, corrective Action in work or
planed, and impact on the launch schedule.
Status of the launch commit criteria and a discussion of any
changes (deltas) to.the previous mission baseline.
Identification and status of any essential facility, system, or
equipment not operational due to shortage of spare parts, includ-
ing discussion of any work-arounds.
A discussion of significant changes in the CDDT a.ni launch count-
down OMIs.
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Status of other operations and support functions, to include, but
not be limited to the following:
- Range support.
- Personnel training.
- Replacement of limited life components.
-• Material shortages.
- Documentation;
Status of operational software.
. A summary of all residual operational hazard;.
The Manager*Cargo Projects Office ana the Director of Cargo Operations
are responsible for implementing t.he necessary reviews, certifications
and assessments related to the OH cargo and elements thereof in pre-
paration for the STS FRR.
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DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW
PURPOSE
The purpose of this plan is to define the activities for accom-
plishing the Space Shuttle Program Orbital Flight Test (OFT)
Design Certification Review (OCR).
SCOPE
This plan establishes schedules, responsibilities, and proce-
dures for the organization and presentation of briefings and
supporting data required for the OFT Design Certification Review.
APPLICABILITY
This plan is applicable to all NASA organizations and their con-
tractors who have responsibility for the design and development
of Space Shuttle System flight and ground hardware and software.
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The Design Certification Review is a formal, comprehensive
review of all hardware and software elements of the Space
Shuttle System. The primary review will be conducted at
the project level with summary briefings and certifications
presented to program management and will culminate in final
presentations to the OCR Board chaired by the Associate
Administrator for Space Transportation Systems.
The presentations must show:
o Design requirements and end item specifications are consistent.
o Design requirements have been met and confirmed by test
results and/or analyses,
o Appropriate remedial actions have been taken to resolve any
significant problems that have arisen.
o Open items and issues that
 must be resolved before flight?
The oral briefings to the OCR Board will be supplemented by
written statements by cognizant managers certifying that hardware
and/or softv/are elements for which they are responsible meet all
of the requirements set forth in applicable specifications (or
that approved waivers have been obtained) and are capable of
supporting the Space Shuttle Orbital Flight Test Program.
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OCR CYCLE - The OCR will be divided into three phases;
o Phase I - Individual review of data and preparation of
briefings by respective project managers
o Phase II - Program Manager's review and critique of the summary
briefings and supporting data
o Phase III - Summary briefings with written supporting data
to the OCR Board
Phase I - Phase I will consist of reviews by individual project managers
covering the respective program elements for which they have responsi-
bility. Design assessment briefings will be prepared by the appropriate NASA/
contractor organizations and presented to the respective project managers for
review. Corrective actions and revisions resulting from these reviews will
be incorporated into the briefings prior to the Phase II review.
Phase II - Phase II will consist of a preboard review of the
presentations and supporting data on all progran elements by the
Program Manager.
The purpose of the Phase II review is to:
o Assure adequate depth, accuracy and consistency of coverage
for each element of the Space Shuttle System ..
o Technically critique the data to be submitted, and the proposed
presentations.
o Assure that presentations and supporting data are properly integrated
for submittal to the OCR Board.
The presentations and supporting data for Phase II should
approach the content of the briefings and data to be
submitted during Phase III. Material added to, or revised in, the
briefings on supporting data subsequent to the Phase II review should be
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coordinated .with the Program Manager prior to Phase III of the OCR.
Changes and revisions should be made only as the result of:
o Additional test results, solutions to problems, and reliability/
verification data.
o Response to action items.
o Open item closures.
o Actions assigned by the Program Manager,
o New problems and proposed corrective actions.
Phase III - Phase III of the OCR will consist of the oral briefings
and supporting data to the OCR Board established and chaired by
the Associate Administrator for Space Transportation Systems.
Post-Phase III - Subsequent to the Phase III review, actions
assigned by the OCR Board must be completed by the responsible
program elements. Recommended action closures will be submitted
through the Program Manager and the Program Director to the
Associate Administrator for recommended closure. All assigned
actions must be closed prior to the Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
for the applicable orbital flight.
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Space Shuttle Program Director - is responsible for:
o Organizing, scheduling and conducting Phase III of the
OCR.
o Reviewing proposed closeout of action items assigned
during Phase III.
o Preparing and executing a Space Shuttle Program Design
Certification Document identifying any actions upon
which certification of the Space Shuttle System is con-
tingent.
Manager, Space Shuttle Program - is responsible for:
o Planning for the OFT OCR.
o Organizing, scheduling and conducting Phase II of the OCR.
.0 Establishing and chairing a Phase II DCR Pre-Board.
o Reviewing and approving closeout of actions resulting from
the Phase II review.
o Reviewing and approving additions or revisions to the
Phase II presentations and supporting data,
o Reviewing proposed closeout of actions resulting from the
Phase III review and submitting recommended closeouts to
the Program Director and the Associate Administrator for
Space Transportation Systems.
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Manager for Management Integration - is responsible for:
o Detailed planning for the OFT OCR.
o Reviewing formats and element plans for the OCR briefings
a n d supporting data. . . .
o Providing the status of OCR implementation progress to the
Program Manager.
Manager for Systems Integration - is responsible for:
o Implementing the requirements of the OFT OCR Plan relative
to Space Shuttle System Integration tasks,
o Reviewing and critiquing the OCR Phase I Space Shuttle
System Integration Plan.
o Assuring the preparation and updating of the Space Shuttle
System Integration briefing and supporting data.
o Presenting the Space Shuttle System Integration assessment
and certification at the Phase II and Phase III OCR Reviews.
Project Managers - The project managers for the Orbiter, the
Space Shuttle Main Engine, the External Tank, the Solid Rocket
Booster, Crew Related Government-Furnished Equipment, Launch
and Landing, and Integrated Communications and Data Systems
are responsible for:
o Implementing the requirements of the OFT OCR Plan within
their respective projects.
o Reviewing and critiquing the OCR Phase I Space Shuttle
reports for their project elements,
o Assuring the preparation and updating of the briefings and
supporting data for the Phase II and Phase III OCR
Reviews.
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o Presenting the assessment and certification for their project
elements at the Phase II and Phase III OCR Reviews.
Director, Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
(SR&QA) - The Director, SR&QA, is responsible for:
o Presenting a summary of hardware/software Level II accepted
risks; projects will present Level III accepted risks,
o Reviewing and critiquing the OCR data presented at the
Phase II and Phase III reviews.
PHASE I REVIEW
ORGANIZATION .
JSC
SYSTEM/ELEMENT
Sys. Int.
Integr. Comm. & Data Sys.
GFE
Orbiter
Safety
ET
SSME
SRB
APPROVAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Mgr. Sys. Int.
Mgr. Integr. Comm. & Data Sys,
Mgr. GFE Proj.
Mgr. Orb. Proj.
Director - SR&QA
MSFC
Mgr. ET
Mgr. ET
Mgr. SRB
Mgr. Launch & Landing Proj.KSC Launch & Landing
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PHASE II REVIEW
Approval Responsibility - OCR Preboard
Preboard membership is as follows:
Chairman: JSC SS Program Mgr.
Members: MSFC Shuttle Proj. Mgr.
KSC Shuttle Proj. Mgr.
JSC Dir. of Engineering and Development
JSC Shuttle Payload Integration and Development Prog. Mgr.
JSC Director of Flight Operations
JSC Manager for OFT
JSC Dir. of Data Systems and Analysis
JSC Dir. of Safety, Reliability & Quality Assur.
JSC Manager Program Operations
JSC Dir. of Space and Life Sciences
SAMSO-Deputy for Space Launch Systems
NASA Hqs. Director, Space Shuttle Program (ex officio)
JSC Director (ex officio)
JSC Deputy Director (ex officio)
PHASE III REVIEW
Approval Responsibility - OCR Board
Chaired by the Assoc. Admin, for Space Transportation Systems,
membership will be established at a later date.
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The Director of Office of Flight Assurance has overall responsibility for the
Spacecraft Design Review Program (SDRP), and will appoint the members
and Chairman of each Design Review Team (ORT) by memorandum.
The Chief, Systems Review Office is responsible for implementing and
executing design reviews and generating design review plans and pro-
cedures .
FEEDBACK AND CLOSEOUT
At the completion of each review a formal report to the
Director, will be prepared by the DRT. Minimum requirements
of the report are:
(a) a summary statement of the DRT findings;
(b) recommendations made by the DRT to the project; and
(c) comments or responses of the project to the findings and
recommendations of the DRT.
The completed design review report wi l l contain the results of
each review conducted for the project together with a mission
launch readiness statement issued by the Chairman of the DRT.
The design review report will be issued and formally accepted
by t!ie Director prior to the launch operation.
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PURPOSE
This instruction defines the policy and general procedures for the
design review of projects.
APPLICABILITY
The provisions of this instruction are applicable to all spacecraft
projects, including experiments and unique support equipment.
DEFINITION
Design Review is a systematic, technically oriented, and documented
evaluation of spacecraft and associated equipment by a team of
specialists.
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All spacecraft and major flight experiments shall be subject to the
SDRP.
The SDRP shall be supported by all Directorates who will furnish the
DRT with senior personnel experienced in the required technical
disciplines.
DESIGN REVIEW OBJECTIVES
The primary objectives of the SDRP is to enhance the probability of success
of spacecraft missions. This objective will be achieved by bringing
to bear on each project the cumulative knowledge of a team of engineers
and scientists who have had extensive prior experience with the particular
types of systems and functions involved. While the design review is tech-
nically oriented, proper consideration will be given to constraints oper-
ating on the projects; particularly those involving primary mission ob-
jectives and program costs and schedules. These reviews shall assure that
each project has the benefit of Centerwide experience gained on other pro-
jects. They shall also provide the Center's review of the projects' Systems
Safety Program.
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The Design Review Team
The D R T w i l l include personnel experienced in design, systems engineering
and integration, reliability, quality assurance, testing, materials, and
other applicable disciplines. The personnel wil l be selected from
throughout the Center with the approval of the appropriate Directors.
Number of Reviews
(1) The Chief, Systems Review Office, Office of Flight Assurance,
in conjunction with the individual Project Manager will develop
a total design review plan. Except in cases of repeat missions,
the following reviews will normally be held:
(a) Design Reviews - these reviews occur during the design phase
and prior to the start of assembly. They will emphasize
implementations of design approaches resulting from the study
phase as well as test plans for the prototype and flight
systems. For new systems generally two design reviews will
be conducted.
(b) Environmental Review - this review occurs after prototype
qualification testing, or prior to acceptance testing if
no prototype is used. The primary purpose of this review
is to determine the qualification status of the hardware
and to evaluate flight acceptance test plans.
(c) Flight Readiness Review - this review will usually take
place prior to shipment of the flight spacecraft to the
launch range, and wil l concentrate on spacecraft per-
formance during acceptance testing.
(d) Flight Operational Readiness Review - this review will be
conducted when a flight operations plan is available. While
all of the previous reviews involve operations, this review
will emphasize the final orbital operations plans, as well
as the compatibility of the spacecraft with ground support
equipment and ground network, including summary results of
the network compatibility tests.
(2) All flight experiments which are required for mission success
are subject to this review program. One or two Experiment de-
sign reviews, depending on need, shall be held prior to in-
tegration.
Design Review Schedule
The several reviews will be conducted on a schedule determined by
the Chief, Systems Review Office after consultation with the individual
Project Manager. The major reviews shall be depicted in the
Monthly Status Review.
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APPLICATION OF MINIMUM STANDARD REVIEWS
TO PAYLOAD CLASSIFICATIONS
The issue of the applicability of the six identified minimum standard
reviews to the payload classifications defined in NMI 8010.1 was addressed
based on the data available. Only one of the documents reviewed addressed
the identification of the nature of the reviews or the requirements for
data evaluation as a function of payload classification. Therefore, the
guidelines contained in this appendix are the result of limited input from
NASA documents combined with interpretation and judgement by ARINC
Research based on the definitions of the payload classifications.
Consequently, these review requirements should be reviewed with the
individual centers to obtain more NASA input.
Due to the nature of Class D payloads, where formal design
verification requirements are limited to safety and STS-compatibility
verification, no attempt was made to evaluate the applicability of
different reviews or data items. In practice, most of these payloads will
be provided to NASA by private companies or universities (such as Getaway
Special canisters), who will perform the majority of the reviews
internally. Reviews by NASA will be limited to safety and interface
analyses, with limited formal evaluation by NASA of their performance
characteristics. In general, the requirements for the evaluation of
Class C payloads could be followed for a Class D payload where applicable
and cost-effective.
The classification of the six minimum reviews as a function of
payload classifications A, B and C is shown in Table E-l.
Most of the reviews are formal reviews, which have the following
characteristics:
- The convening authority issues a written charter for the review
which identifies the scope and objective of the review. The
charter delineates the Board members, review agenda, location,
timetable for the review activities, and specific areas the board
will address.
- The review board consists of the board chairman, board secretary
and an appropriate number of personnel with the proper
qualifications to address the issues before the Board.
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Table E-l. CLASSIFICATION OF REVIEWS
Review
Preliminary Requirements Review
Preliminary Design Review
Critical Design Review
Preshipment Review
Design Certification
Flight Readiness Review
Class A
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Class B
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Class C
Informal
Informal
Informal
Informal
Formal
Formal
Review presentation is generally in the form of viewgraphs, with
copies provided to Review Board members and other attendees.
Requests for action are submitted by Review Board members (and
other attendees if invited to participate) on forms provided by
the Board secretary. Following the review, the review board
reviews the actions items, consolidates them and ensures that the
chairman and cognizant manager understand the intent of the
requests. These requests for action are normally Included as an
attachment to the board report.
Following appropriate Board deliberation and consensus where
possible, the findings of the Board and any recommendations are
prepared by the secretary, approved by the Board, and sent to the
convening authority and the cognizant manager for their study and
disposition. Dissenting opinions may also be attached. The
cognizant manager determines disposition of the findings and
recommendations; e.g., identifies action items, formulates an ad
hoc study team, makes policy decisions, or takes whatever action
he believes is appropriate for each specific finding, concern, or
recommendation.
The responsibility for accepting, rejecting, or acting in part on
the Board's recommendations rests with the cognizant manager. A
written response to the board provides documentation of the
disposition of the recommendations and provides assurance that the
Board's recommendations are properly interpreted and considered.
The cognizant manager reviews proposed action items with those to
whom the action is assigned. They should establish an action plan
(i.e., how the action item will be resolved, by whom, when). The
cognizant manager should report on the status of the action items
to the convening authority, with copies to the Board secretary and
the Office of Engineering and Review.
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- Action items ace closed by memorandum, and copies ace sent to the
chaicman foe appcoval and distcibution. The memocanda ace to
include the supporting infocmation foe the cecommended closuce
action. The secretacy of the Boacd maintains a file of all Boacd
actions, including closuce memocanda, as a centcal point foe all
Boacd members.
A number of the reviews foe Class C payloads may be informal in
natuce. An informal review is distinguished from a formal review in that:
- A memocandum identifying the ceview subject, chairman, independent
reviewer(s), ceview time and location ceplaces a formal written
chactec foe the ceview.
- The Review Boacd may consist of a Boacd chaicman and a minimum
nurabec of individuals, consistent with the size of the pcogcam,
not associated with the pcogcam oc project under ceview.
- Review pcesentation matecial may be limited to existing
documentation, rather than more formal viewgcaphs oc othec
specially-pcepaced raatecial.
- Requests foe action ducing the ceview may be ocal oc wcitten but
special forms ace not required.
- A brief memo may be used to document the ceview findings cathec
than a focmal report.
- Levying the closure of action items may be accomplished by the
cognizant manager cathec than thcough focmal memoranda to the
Review Boacd.
- At pceestablished intecvals the cognizant managec should update
the listing of action item closuces and obtain new closuce dates
on past-due items. This infocmation is distributed periodically
until all action items ace closed.
Other aspects of an infocmal ceview ace similac to a focmal ceview.
The last ceviews foe a Class C payload, the OCR and the FRR, should
be focmal ceviews to pcovide the oppoctunity foe moce focmal ceview and
documentation of the pcoject oc pcogcam pcioc to flight commitment. It
was felt that infocmal eeviews wece not appeopeiate in the final stages of
the system development.
The applicability of the evaluation of specific data items as a
function of payload classification ducing the six ceviews is shown in
Tables E-2 thcough E-7. No distinction could be made between A and B
payloads foe these minimum eeview items. The evaluation of cectain data
items ace eithec not cequiced foe Class C payloads, limited to top-level
analysis, oc limited to safety and STS interface requirements only.
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Table E-2. PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS REVIEW DATA
EVALUATION APPLICABILITY
Review Item/Data
- Statement of mission objectives
- Mission requirements analyses
- Preliminary preferred requirements
- Functional analyses
- Preliminary interface requirements
- Support agreements
- Preliminary reliability and quality
assurance requirements
- Scientific requirements
- Concept drawings and sketches
- Block and logic diagrams
- Costs and schedules
- Design concept documentation
- General test requirements
- Preliminary study reports
- Heritage analyses
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Top-Level
only
X
X
X
X
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Table E-3. PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW DATA EVALUATION APPLICABILITY
Review Item/Data
- Status of PRR action items
- Final functional requirements
- Functional requirements/-
specifications compliance
analyses
- Inherited designs and hardware
suitability analyses
- Environmental design requirements
- Interface design requirements
- Design parameters, restraints,
and constraints
- Block diagrams
- Single-point failure analyses
- Preliminary parts, materials,
and processes list
- Hardware and software development
and schedule (including verifica-
tion tests on analyses to be
performed)
- Software standards to be applied
- Experiment performance analysis
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Safety and
STS interface
items only
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(continued)
Review Item/Data
- Preliminary data management flow
and reduction plans
- Safety, reliability, and quality
assurance compliance plans
- Spares provisioning plans
- Support equipment requirements
and plans
- Preliminary operations planning
- Schedules and status of the
project including cost as well
as technical developments
- Design optimization analyses
- Plans and controls documentation
- Design traceability
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Review Item/Data
- Status of PDR action items
- Hardware and software inheritance
- Specifications (test and
performance)
- Prototype test results
- Design mechanization and analysis
- Design trade-offs and
alternatives considered
- Detailed interfaces and cable
configurations
- Detailed analysis of failure modes
- Safety analyses and human factors
- Maintainability, repairability,
operability, and reliability
- Schedule and resource plans
- Man-machine interfaces
- Training plans
- Conformance of the design to the
functional requirements
- Differences between the system
and subsystem performances
relative to the performances
estimated at the preliminary
design review
- Detailed design parameters,
restraints, and constraints
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
STS interfaces
only
X
X
STS interfaces
only
X
X
X
X
E-7
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(continued)
Review Item/Data
- Interface details/ agreements
- Weight and power
- Detail circuit drawings
- Electronic parts classification
- Screening specifications
- Nonelectronic parts, materials,
and processing list
- Purchased devices lists
- Materials and processing
specifications
- Identification and traceability of
materials and specifications
- Electronic and mechanical parts
stress analysis results
- Worst-case analysis of end-item
failure
- Confo finance to environmental
design requirements
- Details of design, construction,
and electronics packaging
- Quality assurance plans and
procedures
- Manufacturing plans
- Configuration control plans
(hardware and software)
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
Lot trace-
ability
X
X
X
X
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Table B-4. CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW DATA EVALUATION APPLICABILITY
(continued)
Review Item/Data
- Documentation status
- Flow plan and schedule status
(hardware and software)
- Problem/ failure reporting system
- Failure modes and effects analysis
- Preliminary test plans
- Developmental and detailed
test results
- Qualification and acceptance
test plans
- Calibration plan
- Data management plan
- Formal and informal report plans
- Final design verifications plans
- Initial user handling or operating
constraints and precautions
- Spares provisioning
- Support equipment requirements
- Flight operations approach
- Schedule and cost status
- Risk assessment
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Review Item/Data
- Status of prior action item
closeouts
- Current approved drawings and
specifications, and adequate
definition of the end-item,
including approved specification
changes and waivers
- End-item status and documenta-
tion, including all interface
documentation, to assure that the
latest changes have been incorpo-
rated in affected hardware
- Test documentation status and
determination (by review of the
test results) of the adequate and
proper testing of end-items
- Problem/Failure Report documenta-
tion to determine its status and
evaluate its total Impact ,
particularly with respect to risk
for the mission
- Quality assurance history documen-
tation to ensure that necessary
inspections have been performed
and all discrepancies have been
properly closed out
- Shipping and handling require-
ments and plans
- Safety compliance verification
- Status and acceptability of the
deliverable end-item data package
- Risk assessment
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
Top assembly
drawings
and
definition of
end- it em
X
X
Safety and STS
interface items
only
X
X
X
X
X
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Review Item/Data
- Status of previous action items
- Item change data
- Analysis and test documentation
- Reliability documentation
- Safety analyses and human factors
- Specified requirements derived
from mission objectives
- Previous failures/ incidents
analysis
- Physical and functional
configuration verification
- Validation of analytical models
of equipment and system
- Validation of thermal control
design approach
- Hazards control review
- Safety system and subsystem
checklist
- Training of ground flight
personnel
- Operational plans and status
- Mission rules
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
Safety and STS
interface items
only
X
X
X
X
X
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Table E-6. DESIGN CERTIFICATION REVIEW DATA EVALUATION APPLICABILITY
(continued)
Review Item/Data
- Results and status of verification
planning, testing and analysis for
the total system and associated
ground support systems
- Deviations from baseline
configuration
- Configuration inspection
documentation
Class A
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
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Table E-7. FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW DATA EVALUATION APPLICABILITY
Review Item/Data
- Status of prior action item closeouts
- Status of vehicle and launch support
facilities, systems, equipment, range
support, launch commit criteria and
personnel training
- Residual hazards and problem reports
- Status of operation/maintenance
instructions
- Configuration changes since prior
review
- Hardware and software anomalies
- Status of development and qualifica-
tion testing
- Limited life components, life
remaining, and age life/ time cycle
- Status of logistics readiness
(spares support)
- Verification of documentation
completion
- Identification of actual hardware
shortages and open work items
- Safety, reliability, and quality
assurance assessment
- Identification of problems that may
constrain the flight
- Failures/incidents and accidents
reports
Class A
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Class C
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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